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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
NAME AND LIKENESS RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
ENGLAND 
CATHERINE LOUISE BUCHANAN* 
The term right of publicity may appear, at first glance, to be 
relatively straightforward. However, the struggle of contempo-
rary English and American law to define this term and to apply 
the rights which stem from it belie such straightforwardness. In 
the most general language, the right of publicity is the ability of 
an individual to "own, protect and commercially exploit his own 
name, likeness and identity.!!l The derogation, for monetary gain 
of this right, is accomplished by "the use without consent of the 
name, likeness or voice of another"2 and when completed is 
known in American jurisprudence as the appropriation of 
personality.3 
This form of appropriation is concerned exclusively with the 
unauthorized taking of an identifiable characteristic of a person, 
such that its use would be recognized by members of the public." 
This comment will not be concerned with other areas that bor-
der on this topic, such as defamation, copyright, trademark in-
fringement or unfair competition. Appropriation will be dis-
cussed exclusively in relation to the individual characteristics of 
• Rights Manager, Granada Television, England; B.A., Sarah Lawrence College, 
Bronxville, New York, 1982; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 1986; LL.M., 
London School of Economics, 1987. 
1. Rader, The Right of Publicity - A New Dimension, 61 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 228 
(1979). 
2. Frazer, Appropriation of Personality - A New Tort? 99 L.Q. REV. 281 (1983). 
3. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
4. [d. at 309. 
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private individuals and celebrities whose names and likenesses 
comprise a commercial identity. 
This comment will initially examine English law regarding 
appropriation, using as a point of departure the early profes-
sional cases. It will then discuss the contemporary standard ap-
plied in modern actions under the theory of passing off, tracing 
the development of the theory. Thirdly, the right of privacy will 
be examined from the American perspective. The right of pub-
licity, the fourth topic, is derived from the right of privacy. Fi-
nally, after a brief look at the extrajudicial source of the rules 
utilized by the British Advertising Industry, the comment will 
conclude with a discussion of the author's proposals for future 
legislation. 
I. EARL Y ENGLISH "PROFESSIONAL CASES" 
The need to control the use of one's own name for commer-
cial purposes was brought before the courts as far back as the 
year 1847 in the case of Routh v. Webster.1! Routh involved the 
request for an injunction to prevent the defendant from using 
the plaintiff's name, which had been incorrectly listed as a trus-
tee in a prospectus issued by the defendant. The decision grant-
ing the injunction provided the initial recognition that such un-
authorized use of an individual's name was fundamentally 
unjust. The force of the language used by Lord Langdale in ren-
dering his opinion gave cause for optimism to other plaintiffs 
similarly situated: "What! Are they to be allowed to use the 
name of any person they please, representing him as responsible 
in their speculations, and to involve him in all sorts of liabili-
ties ... [c]ertainly not!"6 The use of an injunction was an effec-
tive means by which to protect against defendant Webster's ap-
propriation, but in this case relief was predicated upon a theory 
of defamation, since the court feared that to hold otherwise 
would expose the plaintiff to liability.7 However, in the years to 
come, judicial relief in this or any other form was not as readily 
provided. 
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The following year produced the case of Clark v. Freeman.8 
Lord Langdale was again requested to grant an injunction to the 
plaintiff, in this instance a prominent physician, to prevent the 
defendant from using his name in an advertisement for a fraud-
ulent medicine. The use of the doctor's name was characterized 
not as a misappropriation, but rather as a potential libeP Lord 
Langdale was therefore not concerned with the issue arising out 
of a claim to protect against unauthorized use, but was instead 
requested to prevent the plaintiff from being defamed.10 Al-
though it might appear that the liability which may arise in con-
junction with a harmful product might equal that of a business 
misrepresentation, the injunction was denied. ll 
Lord Langdale gave as his reason for the abrupt change of 
position the court's inability to "stay the publication of a li-
bel. "12 However, his reasoning may more accurately be reflected 
by his comment: "I do not go along with the notion, that this 
physician, eminent as he is, and an honor to any country, has 
been seriously injured in his reputation by any such false state-
ments as have been published by the defendant. illS Although 
Langdale described the conduct of the defendant in using the 
doctor's name without his consent as "disgraceful,"14 by denying 
relief he set the stage upon which well-known professionals and 
celebrities would struggle, mostly without success, to control the 
use of their names. 
The absence of legal protection continued although criti-
cized, for example, by the Earl of Selborne in the case of In re 
Riviere's Trademark. 1 r. There, the Clark case was mentioned as 
establishing the proposition that unless a business interest is in-
jured, there is no cause of action to sustain an application for 
injunction. The Earl of Selborne remarked on the artificial dis-
tinction between the harm to a business as opposed to a profes-
sional interest, stating: "Could not a professional man be injured 
in his profession by having his name associated with a quack 
8. 50 Eng. Rep 759 (M.R. 1848). 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 761. 
11. Id. at 762. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 761-62. 
14. Id. at 762. 
15. 26 Ch.D. 48 (C.A. 1884). 
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medicine?"16 Unfortunately for professional plaintiffs, damage in 
the form of loss of respect by contemporaries is not as easily 
quantifiable as the loss of income or profit to a business. 
The effect of Clark u. Freeman was felt stongly in the pro-
fessional cases which followed in its wake. Of striking signifi-
cance is the case of Williams u. Hodge & CO.17 In that case, the 
plaintiff was a well respected surgeon whose name was used in 
conjunction with a catalog advertisement for a standard surgical 
instrument.Is The basis of the plaintiff's complaint was that the 
advertisement would damage his reputation in the eyes of the 
medical profession, as the instrument offered in the catalogue 
was of a simple nature.19 Justice Kay, in delivering his opinion, 
conceded that "[t]he defendants had no more right to use the 
name of this eminent medical man than to take his purse. "20 
In professing a characteristic omniscience assumed by Vic-
torian judges, Justice Kay was compelled to add that he "could 
not conceive that anyone in the world would suppose this Gen-
tleman's professional name would be in the least damaged by 
this most unscrupulous use of it."21 Here, the judge seems to use 
the same reasoning that Lord Langdale applied in Clark, by fo-
cusing on what each perceived to be a lack of monetary injury to 
a plaintiff physician. In both cases, withholding judicial protec-
tion was justified in spite of the ridicule to which the plaintiffs 
were exposed. Due to the defamatory nature of the defendant's 
act, the judgment indicates that the use of the surgeon's name as 
an independent wrong was never considered by Justice Kay. The 
professional cases, as discussed later, appear to present a signifi-
cant obstacle to celebrities seeking to vindicate their own rights 
in appropriation cases. 
The first demand for legal recognition of a property right in 
a name was raised in the case of Du Boulay u. Du Boulay.22 The 
case concerned the appellant's request that the respondent be 
16. [d. at 53. 





22. 2 L.R.-P.C. 430 (1869). 
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permanently enjoined from assuming as his own the surname of 
Du Boulay.23 The respondent's mother had formerly been a 
slave to the appellant's family, and had for a period of 23 years 
used the name Du Boulay without interference or objection.24 
After hearing all of the evidence, Judge Woodcock gave judg-
ment in favor of the respondent. 211 With reference to the claim 
brought by the appellant, Judge Woodcock expressed his opin-
ion by saying: "Thank [h]eaven, I know of no [l]aw which I can 
be called on to administer by which such an attempt can be sup-
ported."26 The recognition of a proprietary right enabling one to 
exclude others from adopting a particular name was conclusively 
denied.27 Although this ruling was intended to benefit only the 
particular respondent, it did so to the detriment of those who, in 
a professional capacity, invested time and labor into creating a 
market from which their name could attract revenue. 
The reluctance of English judges to hold in favor of plain-
tiffs claiming the right to control the uses to which their names 
were applied continued until the case of British Medical Associ-
ation u. Marsh. 28 The defendant in this action had used the ini-
tials "BMA" as the name for his chain of drug stores.29 That 
these particular letters signify to the public the institution bet-
ter known as the British Medical Association was known by the 
defendant.30 By taking these letters for his own commercial ven-
ture, Mr. Marsh was attempting, the court determined, to mis-
lead the public into believing that his drug stores were associ-
ated with one of England's most venerated institutions.31 The 
defendant advanced a most unusual argument in his attempt to 
exculpate himself, claiming that the initials were in fact nothing 
more than the first letter of each name in the drug store part-
nership: "Bushby, Marsh and Atkinson."32 This claim was found 
by Justice Maugham to be "an obvious and ridiculous un-
23. Id. at 431. 
24. Id. at 431-32. 
25. Id. at 435. 
26. Id. at 433. 
27. Id. at 434-35. 
28. 48 R.P.C. 565 (1931). 
29.Id. 
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truth."33 Relief in the form of an injunction was granted only 
due to a finding that "the acts of the defendant tend to injure 
the plaintiffs in their business both by tending to cause existing 
members of the Association to leave . . . and to cause qualified 
medical men not yet members ... to abstain from joining."34 
Thus, only due to the existence of a tangible monetary loss, was 
the court willing to provide a remedy. 
The unwillingness of the English courts to abandon their 
rigid posture when faced with individual requests for protection 
against appropriation is also reflected in the case of Dockrell v. 
Dougalz.s" The facts involved another physician, Dr. Dockrell, 
who had attained distinction as a specialist. 36 As plaintiff in this 
case, he objected to the defendant's use of his name in an adver-
tisement circular, which purported to link the doctor with an en-
dorsement of a potentially harmful elixir guaranteed to cure 
gout.37 The plaintiff's inability to establish a direct financial loss 
accruing from the advertisement proved fatal to his request for 
an injunction.38 
Judge Williams, having relied on the cases which preceded 
Dr. Dockrell's claim, stated: "in this case ... the plaintiff has 
failed to prove anything more than the use of his name by the 
defendant without authority."39 Having succinctly assessed the 
basis for the plaintiff's claim, the denial of relief was ascribed to 
the lack of precedent to support Dr. Dockrell's assertion.40 Per-
haps if the plaintiff had been held responsible for physical injury 
resulting from the purchase and consumption of the elixir, the 
court may have had the prerequisite damages upon which to 
base a recovery for the plaintiff. This holding clearly established 
that in the absence of pecuniary loss, a professional did not have 
a property right in his name, and as such was without protection 
against appropriation. This view was expressed in the concurring 
judgment of L.J. Romer: 
33. [d. 
34. [d. at 576. 
35. 80 L.T.R. 556 (1899). 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
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It has been contended that the unauthorised use 
of the plaintiff's name gives a cause of action; that 
there is a right of property in a man's name so 
that any use of that name by another will be ac-
tionable if the use is unauthorised and may be to 
the detriment of the plaintiff in his profession. 
There is no authority for such a proposition; it 
goes too far and is unsound!l 
307 
This opinion strengthened the foundation on which defend-
ants could escape liability for the appropriation of an individ-
ual's name or likeness. By requiring that only the manner in 
which a plaintiff could demonstrate actual loss was by proving 
economic injury, the court's narrowconstuction worked to pre-
clude viable complaints. 
Tolley v. J.S. Fry and Sons, Ltd.42 is one of the most fa-
mous of the early appropriation cases. The plaintiff in Tolley 
was a stockbroker by profession, who was well known for his sta-
tus as an amateur golfer.43 The defendant Fry, a firm which 
manufactured chocolates,used Tolley's name accompanied by a 
caricature of him playing golf in an advertisement for their 
product.44 Without obtaining the plaintiff's permission the ad-
vertisement appeared in two daily newspapers."Ci The plaintiff's 
complaint alleged that a libel had been committed against him: 
it appeared that he had accepted compensation for the use of his 
name in conjunction with the product, and the implication that 
he had been paid in his capacity as a golfer would threaten his 
amateur standing."s 
Evidence before the appellate court indicated that the de-
fendant had received a letter from their advertising agents 
which warned that a suggested second advertisement, involving 
caricatures of two tennis amateurs, could give rise to potential 
liability."7 This letter read: "[I]n tennis circles, even more than 
in golf circles, the amateur status must be carefully guarded, 
41. [d. 
42. 1 K.B. 467 (1930). 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 468. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. at 467. 
47. [d. at 469. 
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hence if Cyril Tolley has any quarrel with us, it is more than 
likely that both Helen Wills and Betty Nuthall would be upset 
at our caricaturing them for advertising purposes.""8 The lack of 
integrity on the part of the defendant is illustrated by the fact 
that, knowing sales of Fry Chocolate would be enhanced by an 
endorsement from Mr. Tolley, the advertisement appeared in 
two newspapers, and exposed the plaintiff to what was later 
found to be a libel. 49 
For a brief moment, Mr. Tolley's right to regulate use of his 
name and likeness was given lucid expression by Judge Greer's 
statement: "[T]he defendants in publishing the advertisement in 
question without first obtaining Mr. Tolley's consent, acted in a 
manner inconsistent with the decencies of life, and in so doing 
they were guilty of an act for which there ought to be a legal 
remedy."M The defendant Fry was responsible for the harm and 
embarrassment suffered by the plaintiff. III Although the desire to 
reap commercial gain at the expense of another is not looked 
upon favorably in other areas of the law, the drastic need for 
reform regarding appropriation was ignored by Judge Greer's 
eventual holding. Judge Greer distinguished the public attention 
given to Mr. Tolley for his golfing achievement from the status 
of an anonymous member of society: "Some men and women 
voluntarily enter professions by which their nature invite public-
ity ... [i]t is not unreasonable in their case that they should 
submit without complaint to their names and occupations and 
reputations being treated as matters of public interest, and al-
most as public property."112 This holding, taken to the logical ex-
treme, would grant a free license to anyone with creative or fi-
nancial resources who wished to capitalize upon the fame of 
others. Although the public has an interest in the personal ad-
vances made by a celebrity in his career, Judge Greer's holding 
confuses the right to obtain information with a personal right 
which allows only the individual figure to use his talents for 
commercial exploitation. Judgment was however rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff. liS In seeking to protect Mr. Tolley's ama-
48. [d. 
49. [d. at 476. 
50. [d. at 478. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 477. 
53. [d. at 476. 
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teur standing, the claim of libel was included almost as an after-
thought.1I4 As noted by a contemporary legal writer, "had the 
plaintiff been a professional golfer he would not have succeeded 
in his claim . . . as the adverse imputation would not then have 
amounted to a libel."l1l1 
That relief was made available to the plaintiff does not dis-
count the fact that the opinions regarding the case were short-
sighted. An amateur athelete usually progresses in his sport un-
til he reaches the standing of a professional. Tolley's future 
merchandising and endorsement potential were limited by the 
defendant's advertisement. In addition to safeguarding the 
plaintiff's status as an amateur, his future earning capacity 
should also have been recognized. 
Unfortunately, the Fry case is not helpful in seeking to es-
tablish the proposition that an individual has a viable right in 
and of itself to protect the unauthorized use of his name and 
likeness. In spite of the fact that judgment was in favor of the 
plaintiff, the court was unwilling to make an award on the basis 
of misappropriation of personality. This case illustrates that 
even where a claim for misappropriation was vindicated, the tort 
itself remained undeveloped as a result of the other legal reme-
dies upon which relief was predicated. The judgments provided 
in the professional cases reflect Judge Greer's holding in Tol-
ley.1I6 Although disposed to granting protection, he was hindered 
by the doctrine of precedent and the policy considerations which 
almost uniformly dictated that recovery should be denied. Aside 
from the financial losses by plaintiffs, the law should have been 
sensitive to the element of dignity that is lost by allowing appro-
priation abuses to occur. Such abuses could be alleviated if En-
glish jurisprudence would accept that "any unauthorized ex-
ploitation other than for the legitimate purposes of news 
reporting and free speech may be civil misappropriation. "117 
The English professional cases culminate in Sim u. H.J. 
54. [d. at 475. 
55. Coleman, The Unauthorized Commercial Exploitation Of The Names And 
Likenesses Of Real Persons, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 189 (1982). 
56. Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., 1 K.B. 467, 482 (1930). 
57. Coleman, supra note 55, at 194. 
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Heinz Co. Ltd/'s Here, the defendant, Heinz Company, engaged 
an advertising firm to prepare several commercials for their 
product to be directed toward a television audience.59 The ad-
vertisements involved a cartoon figure which, due to its anony-
mous form, was itself innocuous, but was accompanied by a 
voice which impersonated that of the plaintiff, Alistair Sim.60 
Sim, an actor whose career was confined exclusively to the stage 
and film industry, sought an injunction against the defendant to 
prevent the continued broadcast of the television advertise-
ment.61 He argued that his reputation and notoriety as an actor 
were compromised by the defendant's use of his voice in con-
junction with products which, plaintiff's counsel claimed, "do 
not represent our client's beliefs and persons listening to the 
broadcasts would think that our client was prepared, for money, 
to make statements that he did not believe."62 
Of paramount concern to the plaintiff was the fear that his 
dignity would be lost in the eyes of both members of his profes-
sion as well as the viewing public.63 Unlike many famous actors 
of today, Alistair Sim did not want to be seen to have "traded" 
on his reputation for the purpose of promoting a commodity 
such as that produced by the defendant.64 
Due to the fact that the case involved proceedings for an 
interlocutory injunction, the central issue, whether a passing off 
action had in fact occurred, remained unresolved. In spite of the 
denial of the injunction, Judge McNair noted that "it would 
seem to me to be a great defect in the law if it were possible for 
a party, for the purpose of commercial gain, to make use of the 
voice of another party without his consent."61\ McNair's holding 
was consistent with the cases previously discussed in that the 
absence of tangible damage to the plaintiff was the reason for 
withholding the requested injunction.66 Indeed, had the court 
been amenable to viewing the case outside the confines of the 
58. 1 W.L.R. 313 (1959). 
59. Id. at 314. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. at 314-15 
62. Id. at 315. 
63. Id. at 314-15 
64.Id. 
65. Id. at 317. 
66. Id. at 317-18 
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law of defamation, the matter could have been litigated on the 
merits as a misappropriation. Sim v. Heinz still remains a 
landmark case in the development of the need for a property 
right to be recognized in appropriation cases. 
The professional cases indicate the refusal by British judges 
to recognize the tort of misappropriation as applied to the repu-
tation of an individual. While the opinions often reflect disap-
proval regarding the taking of a name and likeness, they illus-
trate an effort to link liability with other well established forms 
of law. As with Tolley v. J.S. Fry and Sons, Ltd., most plaintiffs, 
otherwise able to recover on a claim of libel, would still be pre-
vented from enjoining defendants, if their likenesses were used 
for commercial ventures. 
The same lack of judicial protection would apply to those 
businessmen who, unlike the plaintiff in the Routh case, sought 
recovery under a theory other than defamation. Unfortunately, 
as illustrated by both Clark and Sim, a claim of defamation may 
not be sufficient to provide protection against unauthorized use. 
Application of property law has also proved unsuccessful, as in 
the Dockrell case, when the plaintiff was unable to prevent his 
reputation from being used by those engaged in the manufacture 
of a fraudulent medicine. 
In cases where relief was granted, there appears to be a ten-
dency on the part of the judges to formulate the remedy to fit 
within previously recognized causes of action. This is evident in 
Pollard, which relied upon an implied contract, and Prince Al-
bert, where a finding for the plaintiff was based upon a breach of 
confidence. 
The judgments above demonstrate the uniform refusal to 
accept a right pertaining to name and likeness. Although certain 
cases provide protection, there is a complete absence of litiga-
tion under the specific claim of misappropriation. As a result of 
the consistent refusal on the part of British judges to grant 
awards based upon the unauthorized taking of one's "personal-
ity," it is to the law of passing off that one must turn. 
11
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II. PASSING OFF 
Initially, the law of passing off was designed to protect trad-
ers from misrepresentations which ascribed to one set of goods 
the goodwill established in another.67 This action was later ap-
plied to the area of commercial services, although all passing off 
claims are predicated on the theory that "nobody has any right 
to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else."68 Liability 
under this action may arise from the straightforward taking of 
another's trademark, the deceptive use of a product identifica-
tion scheme and activities in which the public are confused into 
thinking that the defendant's goods are those of the plaintiff.69 
Injury is measured by the potential or actual loss of the plain-
tiff's business, and, in a successful case, will result in both an 
injunction to restrain the defendant and an award of damages.7o 
This tort may be invoked against those who are unaware of the 
goods sold by the plaintiff, thus making ineffective a defense 
based upon innocence.71 
The basic elements necessary to sustain a passing off action 
have been summarized as: "(1) the plaintiff's own reputation; (2) 
the defendant's representation; and (3) likelihood of damage to 
the plaintiff. "72 The first criteria requires the plaintiff to estab-
lish that he owns the goodwill in either the name or reputation 
of his business.7s A successful commercial reputation, although 
intangible, is the type of property which passing off seeks to pro-
tect.74 It is therefore essential that prior to a showing of public 
confusion, goodwill be proven to exist.7~ Lord MacNaghten, with 
what might have been some difficulty, defined goodwill as "the 
attractive force which brings in custom."76 This meaning alone 
does not suggest a difference between goodwill and reputation. 
67. W. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; PATENTS. COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND 
ALLIED RIGHTS 473 (1981). 
68. Reddaway v. Banham, 13 R.P.C. 199, 204 (H.L. 1896). 
69. [d. at 204-05. 
70. Cornish, supra note 67, at 473. 
71. [d. at 485. 
72. [d. at 475. 
73. [d. at 477. 
74. Warnink v. J. Townend & Sons, App. Cas. 731, 735-38 (H.L. 1979). 
75. [d. at 739. 
76. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd., App. Cas. 
217, 224 (H.L. 1901). 
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Still, for goodwill to be established, a thriving business interest 
is required, while reputation may exist independently from com-
mercial ventures.77 
Although reputation is an important element in assessing 
goodwill, the two are distinct terms best illustrated by a product 
which may have a reputation but is bereft of goodwill. Passing 
off actions protect the goodwill in a product by safeguarding the 
business which fostered its growth. 
To fulfill the second element, a representation which makes 
difficult the distinction between the defendant's goods or ser-
vices and those of the plaintiff must be made.78 This representa-
tion need not be intentional nor fraudulent, but the public must 
actually believe, or be likely to believe, that they are receiving 
the plaintiff's product when in fact the goods are derived from 
another source.79 In the absence of a viable defense, the court 
may infer that a similar name or style of packaging was used by 
the defendant with the objective of appropriating the plaintiff's 
goodwill.80 Although a plaintiff is not required to prove that de-
ception actually occurred, he or she must demonstrate that a 
substantial number of the public is likely to be confused.81 The 
unlawful association of the defendant's goods with those of the 
plaintiff will depend upon the existence of a common field of 
activity.82 It is precisely this factor which makes passing off an 
ineffective remedy for celebrities. The names and likenesses of 
famous individuals frequently appear on products unrelated to 
the area in which notoriety was derived. As a result, the common 
field of activity requirement has made possible merchandising 
schemes which could have been prevented had the parties been 
involved in a similar business venture. An overlap in the busi-
ness enterprises engaged in by the parties is essential, to sustain 
a claim under this theory, for a difference in product or relevant 
consumer market can often preclude recovery.83 
77. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar, Fleet Street Rep. 413 (C.A. 1984). 
78. Cornish, supra note 67, at 475. 
79. Warnink, App. Cas. at 740. 
80. William Edge & Sons, Ltd. v. William Niccolls & Sons, Ltd., App. Cas. 693 (H.L. 
1911). 
81. Cornish, supra note 67, at 489. 
82. McCulloch v. May, Ltd., 2 All E.R. 845, 846 (1947). 
83. [d. at 851. 
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The third and final requirement dictates that in the absence 
of actual injury the plaintiff demonstrate likelihood of damage.8 • 
Most frequently, the loss occurs when misled consumers 
purchase alternative goods.8 & If the same purchaser becomes dis-
satisfied with what he believes to be the plaintiff's product, and 
ceases entirely to buy the goods, the plaintiff's position in the 
market will be threatened. Damage is therefore closely linked 
with business goodwill in cases of passing off.86 The specific re-
quirements for passing off are discussed in greater detail in the 
context of the cases to follow. It is interesting to note that, al-
though factual situations bearing all the requirements for sus-
taining a claim may be presented, recovery is still not easily 
granted. The courts are reluctant to interfere with fair competi-
tion, and must, in passing off actions, balance the plaintiff's pro-
prietary right in his goodwill against the interests of those en-
gaged in a rival business.87 Too frequently the balance is in favor 
of those who capitalize on the popularity of others. 
The case of McCulloch v. May, Ltd. 88 is a logical starting 
point from which to examine the body of law relating to passing 
off actions. The plaintiff, McCulloch, alleged the unauthorized 
taking by the defendant of the name made famous by the plain-
tiff as "Uncle Mac."88 Mr. McCulloch was a broadcaster origi-
nally employed in 1926 by the British Broadcasting Corporation 
to present a show entitled "The Children's Hour."90 Before each 
program, he was introduced as "Uncle Mac" and, as a conse-
quence of the overwhelming success of the show, he went on to 
perform other functions such as charitable fund raiser, recording 
personality, lecturer and author of children's books, retaining 
the name Uncle Mac.91 Unfortunately, Mr. McCulloch/Uncle 
Mac was disabled, having lost a limb and the sight of one eye.92 
Due to his physical hardship, the plaintiff was forced to employ 
a secretary to help him reply to the huge amount of correspon-
84. Cornish, supra note 67, at 475. 
85. Wamink, App. Cas. at 740. 
86. [d. at 754. 
87. Cadbury Schweppes v. Pub Squash Co. Ltd., 1 All E.R. 213 (1981). 
88. 2 All E.R. 845 (1947). 
89. [d. at 848. 
90. [d. at 846. 
91. [d. at 847. 
92. [d. 
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dence he received, particularly from children.93 These letters 
contained a brief mention of the plaintiff's disability, and ex-
plained why Mr. McCulloch was unable to attend the various 
functions to which he was invited.94 
The defendant was the managing director of a company 
which produced breakfast food.911 The plaintiff objected to the 
marketing of a cereal called "Uncle Mac's Puffed Wheat" which 
included on the carton a panel which stated in part: "You know 
the difficulties of travel these days, and will understand that Un-
cle Mac can't get about as freely as he would like to, but ... he 
will always do his best to please his many friends wherever they 
may be."96 Based upon the name of the cereal produced by Mr. 
May's company, and the inscription on the carton, the plaintiff 
sought to prove that the defendant was attempting to exploit his 
personality for economic gain, and brought an action for passing 
off. 97 
The elements for a passing off action require the plaintiff to 
show that he was in possession of a protectable property right; 
that this interest was infringed by the defendant; and that this 
infringement damaged the plaintiff by confusing the public into 
thinking that the defendant's "profession, business or goods" 
could be attributed as belonging to the plaintiff.98 Although it 
may appear that. the name and packaging of Uncle Mac's Puffed 
Wheat could be construed as a blatant attempt by Mr. May to 
trade on the good reputation of the plaintiff, the court held that 
an action for passing off could not be sustained.99 Judge Wynn-
Parry began his opinion by stating the familiar principle that: 
"It is established beyond argument that under the law of Eng-
land a man is not entitled to exclusive proprietary rights in a 
fancy name in vacuo."lOO This maxim of English jurisprudence 
was well entrenched in the series of professional cases which ex-
isted prior to Judge Winn-Parry's judgment, and its value as a 




96. [d. at 848. 
97. [d. at 849. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 851. 
100. [d. at 849. 
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undisturbed. IOI 
What is most unfortunate about this case is the finding that 
because "the plaintiff is not engaged in any degree in providing 
or marketing puffed wheat, how can the defendant, in using the 
fancy name used by the plaintiff be said to be passing off the 
goods or the business of the plaintiff."102 In dismissing Mr. Mc-
Culloch's claim on the basis that the business of producing puf-
fed wheat was distinct from that of a broadcasting celebrity, the 
judge significantly altered the potential effectiveness that the 
tort of passing off could have had in controlling appropriations. 
The devastating effect of the requirement that there be a causal 
connection uniting plaintiffs with defendants in such cases was 
aptly commented on by Mr. Frazerl03 who pointed out in a re-
cent article: 
This requirement would mean that an action in 
passing off would lie in respect of appropriation 
of personality only where the plaintiff carried on 
the same sort of business as the one in which the 
defendant had appropriated the plaintiff's per-
sonality. A rock star who does not manufacture, 
or might reasonably be expected to manufacture 
in the future, mints would have no remedy where 
his name or likeness is used in an advertisement 
for them; even a sporting personality who did not 
also sell sports wear would have no action in anal-
ogous circumstances. 104 
The difficult position of an English plaintiff in an action for 
appropriation is not limited to the inconvenience of the common 
field of activity requirement. Judge Wynn-Parry has taken a 
rigid stand on the right of personality when he notes: "If I were 
to accede to the plaintiff's claim I should, as I see it, not merely 
be extending quite unjustifiably the scope of the action of pass-
ing off, but I should be establishing an entirely new remedy, and 
that I am quite unprepared to do. "lOll 
101. [d. at 851. 
102. [d. 
103. A solicitor and lecturer in law at the University of Newcastle Upon Tyne. 
104. Frazer. supra note 2. at 289. 
105. McCulloch, 2 All E.R. at 851. 
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In his book, The Protection of Privacy, Mr. Wacks, a noted 
legal writer, describes in detail the array of claims that can be 
brought to rectify appropriations. loe But he does not mention 
that, unless each element of a passing off action is pleaded and 
proved, the plaintiff's complaint will be deficient and subse-
quently fail. 
The type of wrongdoing that this tort has been designed to 
correct was described as foUows: "the chief purpose of the tort of 
passing off is to protect traders against a rival who seeks to ac-
quire by means of deception, the plaintiff's reputation."lo7 
Wacks later concludes that actions such as passing off are lack-
ing in effectiveness, for the requirement that there be a common 
field of activity and confusion in the mind of the public are 
often difficult to prove.108 His treatment of the subject as a via-
ble form of protection is accurate if one considers the remedy in 
its theoretical state. But in the actual litigation of these cases, 
the law must be applied in its static form, which includes appli-
cation of the rigid requirements necessary to sustain a claim 
under this cause of action. The discrepancy between the factual 
basis of the claims and the strict requirements of passing off ac-
tions has been the source of judicial weakness. A recent articlelo9 
assessed the reticence of the English courts to hear passing off 
actions: 
There has been a regrettable tendency . . . to 
restict the scope of the action for passing-off by 
laying down what appears to be hard and fast 
rules, which may inhibit courts from dealing with 
cases on the basis of the particular facts of each. 
It is regrettable, because, one of the chief virtues 
of a non-statutory cause of action ought to be its 
adaptability to changing commercial circum-
stances and practices. llo 
The High Court of New South Wales reacted against the 
insistence on the presence of a common field of activity for 
106. R. WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 170 (1980). 
107. [d. at 169. 
108. [d. at 170. 
109. Morcom, Character Merchandising - A Right or Mere Opportunity? EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV., Oct. 1978, at 7. 
110. [d. at 8. 
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claims of passing off. The case of Henderson v. Radio Corpora-
tion lll sharply contrasted to the decision in McCulloch, for the 
Henderson plaintiff was able to sustain a passing off action with-
out the necessity of establishing that his business was materially 
similar to that of the defendant.ll2 
Since the case was tried in a jurisdiction other than Eng-
land, it was of persuasive authority only. Consequently, Hender-
son had a limited impact in Britain. The case involved the plain-
tiff Hendersons, professional ballroom dancers, who, as husband 
and wife, had gained notoriety both in England and Australia. ll3 
From the time of their emigration to Australia, twelve years 
before the commencement of this action, they were engaged in 
the business of public performances as well as teaching their art 
to private individuals.1H The defendant company was a distribu-
tor of record albums in Australia, and placed on the market a 
record entitled "Strictly For Dancing: Vol 1."1111 Without secur-
ing the plaintiff's permission, the defendant used a photograph 
of the Hendersons dancing together on the cover of the album 
which gave rise to this claim for passing off.lls 
Judge Sugarman initially granted an injunction to restrain 
the defendant from selling the album.ll7 The opinion contains a 
finding that there was a common field of activity between the 
demonstrations given by the plaintiff and the defendant's pro-
duction of a record suitable for dance instruction.ll8 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the buying public would be deceived into 
thinking that the photograph on the album cover constituted an 
endorsement of the record itself.ll9 On appeal, Judge Evatt de-
termined that passing off actions were to be applied to those en-
gaged in business.l20 He construed commercial activity as denot-
ing any form of enterprise.121 In a strong criticism of Judge 
111. R.P.C. 218 (1969). 
112. [d. at 233. 
113. [d. at 219. 
114. [d. at 220. 
115. [d. at 221. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. at 230. 
118. [d. at 234. 
119. [d. at 222. 
120. [d. at 234. 
121. [d. 
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Winn-Parry's holding in McCulloch, Judge Evatt held that if 
the parties to a passing off action are involved. in a business, 
"[t]here does not seem to be any reason why it should also be 
necessary that there be an area, actual or potential, in which 
their activities conflict."122 Judge Manning's concurring opinion 
altered the traditional requirements for a passing off claim by 
noting that the existence of a common field of activity was 
merely a factor in determining if public confusion and damage 
had occurred. 123 
In dismissing the appeal, Judge Manning boldly stated "it is 
going too far to say that the absence of this so called common 
field of activity necessarily bars a plaintiff from relief. "l2. In 
spite of the relative ease with which the Henderson court "re-
wrote" the law of passing off, the overall effectiveness of the 
judgment is diminished by the fact that the parties were busi-
ness competitors in fields closely related.l2lI As such, the court's 
opinion may be classified as dicta. Since McCulloch concerned 
parties with distinct business enterprises, the case is easily dis-
tinguished from the claim brought by the Hendersons. 
Regardless of the jurisdictional division, the Henderson de-
cision did have some impact in England three years later in the 
case of Annabel's Ltd. (Berkeley Square) v. Schock.128 In this 
action for passing off, the common field of activity requirement 
was described, in a manner similar to that of the Henderson 
court, as a highly relevant consideration.127 The facts of the case 
involved the successful London nightclub called Annabel's.128 
The defendant company was an escort agency operating under 
the same name.129 The plaintiffs alleged that by adopting the 
name and identical spelling of their nightclub, the defendant 
was attempting to establish in the minds of the public that his 
business was somehow associated with plaintiffs.130 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 236. 
124. [d. at 242. 
125. [d. at 234. 
126. R.P.C. 838 (1972). 
127. [d. at 845. 
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The defendant placed advertisements in several publica-
tions including two newspapers and a guide to London.lsl These 
in turn contained "a great many advertisements of various kinds 
such as massage therapy, Miss Petal escorts for Paris or London 
weekends,"ls2 which were followed by the defendant's 
advertisement. ls3 
The defendant had printed the following advetisement in 
the Times newspaper: "Annabel's Mayfair Escort Agency [has] 
intelligent, interesting and high standard girls. "IS4 The plaintiff's 
secretary, Miss Cameron, gave evidence that in her capacity as 
receptionist she received a total of six incoming telephone in-
quiries from women who had read the defendant's advertise-
ment and were enthusiastic at the prospect of working as es-
corts.13& Miss Cameron also stated that two women had arrived 
at the back door of the club and, like those making incoming 
calls, were curious as to the possibility of working for the de-
fendant. lss What is perhaps the most persuasive piece of evi-
dence on the issue of public confusion is the testimony given by 
the plaintiff's secretary that "a few members of Annabel's Club 
telephoned about the escort agency, some expressing surprise 
that the [c]lub should indulge in that field of enterprise and 
others ironically inquiring as to the service offered by the escort 
agency."IS7 In his own defense, the defendant produced a faintly 
credible proposition, claiming that the name" Annabel's" was se-
lected so as to enable his company to be listed on the top of the 
page in publications listing places of entertainment in alphabeti-
cal order .138 
Judge Russell, in dismissing the defendant's appeal and up-
holding the award of an injunction stated: "one of the important 
considerations is whether there is any kind of association . . . in 
the minds of the public. . . between the field of activities of the 
plaintiff and ... [that] of the defendant ... this is simply a 
question in the ultimate decision whether there is likely to be 




135. [d. at 841. 
136. [d. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 842. 
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confusion."ls9 Here, Judge Russell was not rejecting the require-
ment established in the McCulloch case, that a common field of 
activity exist. Rather, his judgment focused on the fact that 
public confusion ensued. l4O 
Although one legal commentator, Morcom, finds from his 
reading of the Annabel case that "nothing . . . could be a 
clearer repudiation of the requirement of a 'common field of ac-
tivity' as a rule of law,m41 the opinion delivered by Judge Rus-
sell expressly illustrates that common ground did exist between 
the plaintiff and defendant. In an interesting turn of phrase, this 
common field of activity was described as follows: "it can be said 
that Annabel's [c]lub provides facilities to men for dining and 
dancing with female partners, [t]urning it round slightly, Mr. 
Schock's business is concerned with supplying for men facilities 
of female partners for the purpose, among other things, of din-
ing and dancing with them."l42 
The plaintiff was awarded an injunction which Judge Rus-
sell upheld on appeap4S The requirement that there be a com-
mon field of activity between plaintiff and defendant remained 
intact after his judgment. Judge Russell's opinion emphasized 
the element of public confusion, and did not eliminate or over-
rule the McCulloch holding. 
The possibility that the tort of passing off would, under 
Henderson and Annabel, expand to protect current forms of 
misappropriation did not materialize. The hope that the com-
mon field of activity requirement would, after Henderson, be re-
laxed, was dashed in the case of Lyngstad v. Anabas Products 
Ltd. l44 This action concerned the Swedish pop group Abba 
which sought to enjoin the defendants from producing and sell-
ing various products such as buttons and t-shirts which con-
tained photographs of the group.l41i Abba contended, like the 
Henderson plaintiff, that members of the public would assume 
139. [d. at 844. 
140. [d. at 845. 
141. Morcom, supra note 109, at 8. 
142. Annabel's, R.P.C. at 845. 
143. [d. at 846. 
144. Fleet Street Rep. 62 (1977). 
145. [d. at 65. 
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that the group had endorsed the defendant's merchandise which 
would then limit their future licensing potential.146 
Judge Oliver refused the plaintiff's claim,147 and his holding 
exhibits the force with which the English courts rejected the 
Henderson case. The common field of activity requirement was 
conclusively affirmed by his decision, which dismissed the Hen-
derson ruling as a misunderstanding by the Australian court of 
this principle of passing off.H8 Judge Oliver's opinion states: 
"The expression 'common field of activity' is not, I think, a term 
of art, but merely a convenient shorthand term for indicating 
the need for a real possibility of confusion, which is the basis of 
the action."H9 The determination by the Lyngstad court that 
the public would not be deceived into associating the plaintiff 
with the goods produced by the defendant resulted in what may 
be termed a gratuitious license to exploit Abba's fame. 
In the same year that the Lyngstad case was tried, the 
copyright owners of cartoon characters called the "Wombles" 
brought a claim against a company using the same name for rub-
bish bins produced by the defendant. lIIO This case differs slightly 
from Lyngstad, in that the plaintiff had taken advantage of li-
censing opportunities by franchising various pictures of the 
characters.1IIl The fact that the Wombles characters were in-
volved in collecting litter in and around Wimbledon Common 
was insufficient to establish a common link with the rubbish 
bins marketed by the defendant.Ui2 As a result, Judge Walton 
held in favor of the defendant, finding that the business of li-
censing copyright material was distinct from cleaning up lit-
ter. IllS This decision implicitly ignored the monetary value that 
the plaintiff derived from its licensing rights. Judge Walton's 
opinion also illustrates the unwillingness of English judges to 
recognize the market value of a licensed name. 
Any favorable contribution that the Henderson case could 
146. [d. at 66. 
147. [d. at 70. 
148. [d. at 67. 
149. [d. 
150. Wombles Ltd. v. Wombles Skips Ltd., R.P.C. 99, 99 (1977). 
151. [d. at 101. 
152. [d. at 102. 
153. [d. 
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have made to passing off actions was obviated after the Lyng-
stad and Wombles decisions. The opinions reflect a judicial con-
tentment with existing criteria. However, in the Ontario court of 
appeal, Krouse, a professional football player, attempted to in-
voke the same protection offered to the Hendersons in his claim 
against the Chrysler Automobile Company.164 The appellant, 
Chrysler, had produced an advertising device called a "spotter" 
to be used in conjunction with its television campaign to market 
automobiles to those viewing professional football games.m At 
the center of the spotter appeared a photograph of the respon-
dent wearing his team uniform.166 Krouse alleged that the use of 
his photograph amounted to the misappropriation of his right to 
endorse products which was afforded to him by virtue of his sta-
tus as a professional athlete.167 He was awarded damages on a 
finding that a passing off had occurred.168 
At the appellate level, Judge Estey reversed the lower 
court's holding, finding that the appellant's business of manu-
facturing automobiles could not be construed as infringing upon 
the respondent's activities as a football player.m The Hender-
son case was distinguished because the record produced by the 
defendant appealed to the same section of the consumer market 
in which the plaintiffs were known, with the result that those 
purchasing the album would incorrectly associate the parties. 160 
Chrysler, on the other hand, was also seeking a trade advantage, 
but its advertising strategy relied upon an abstract association 
with the game of football. 161 Any potential for confusion in the 
minds of the public was negated by the fact that the photograph 
of Krouse depicted him solely as a team member and would not 
imply that he was endorsing the appellant's product.162 In deny-
ing the respondent's motion for compensation for the use of his 
personality, Judge Estey commented on the refusal of the Cana-
dian Judiciary to approve such a right: "Progress in the law is 
not served by the recognition of a right which, while helpful to 
154. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 40 D.L.R.3d 15 (1978). 
155. Id. at 16. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 19. 
158. Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd., 25 D.L.R.3d 49, 69 (1972). 
159. Krouse, 40 D.L.R.3d at 26. 
160. Id. at 25. 
161. Id. at 29. 
162. Id. 
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some persons or classes of persons, turned out to be an unrea-
sonable disruption to the community at large and to the conduct 
of its commerce."163 The claim for passing off could not be main-
tained in light of Krouse's failure to prove that his business en-
deavors had been interfered with by Chrysler. The requisite ele-
ment of public confusion is therefore as stricly adhered to in the 
Canadian courts as it is in England. 
The case of Cadbury Schweppes v. Pub Squash Co. Ltd. 164 
represents a privy council review of passing off as applied in 
New South Wales. The plaintiff, Cadbury Schweppes, had 
placed on the Australian market a beverage called "Solo," which 
was to compete with Coca-Cola.16& Simultaneously, the plaintiff 
launched an extensive advertising campaign on both radio and 
television, which informed the public that Solo was both a man's 
drink and reminiscent of the type of beverage sold in the past.166 
In the hope that consumers would buy Solo as an alternative to 
beer, the container in which it was marketed resembled that 
used for selling beer, complete with an identifiable yellow color 
and medallion.167 One year following the successful introduction 
of Solo, the respondent marketed a beverage called "Pub 
Squash," which utilized a similar bottle, label and advertising 
strategy.168 After a 15% drop in sales, Cad bury Schweppes insti-
tuted proceedings against the defendant for passing Off.169 Judge 
Powell, in the lower court, found that although the defendant 
had intentionally taken advantage of the plaintiff's marketing 
success, the drink produced by the defendant was distinct from 
Solo.170 As such, the only offense committed by the defendant 
was a taking of the plaintiff's advertising effort, which in itself 
did not amount to a passing off.l7l 
On appeal to the privy council, Lord Scarman affirmed the 
prior ruling, having found that respondent's objective was not to 
163. Id. at 30. 
164. 1 All E.R. 213 (1981). 
165. Id. at 215. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 216. 
169. Id. at 217. 
170. Id. at 220. 
171. Id. 
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deceive but was instead to encroach upon a willing market. 172 
The appellant was then required to establish that its product 
derived from the advertising a substantial goodwill entitled to 
protection.173 The privy council was concerned with "the balance 
to be maintained between the protection of a plaintiff's invest-
ment in his product and the protection of free competition."17. 
Absent proof that the public was confused into thinking that 
Pub Squash was the beverage produced by the appellant, there 
was no misappropriation which would justify the court's inter-
vention to restrict competition.1711 If due to the advertising 
scheme Solo had become recognizable to consumers, the appel-
lant would have succeeded in the passing off claim, for his "in-
tangible property right" would have been invaded.176 Lord 
Scarman's view indicates the unwillingness of the British courts 
to grant a monopoly to those using a distinctive advertising 
scheme. Similarly, passing off actions may prove unsuccessful 
when used to prevent others from adopting similar marketing 
strategies, even if accomplished within the same field of business 
enterprise. 
The most recent passing off case, Warnink v. Townend & 
Sons,177 accurately describes the modern requirements for a 
cause of action under this doctrine. Warnink involved as plain-
tiff a Dutch manufacturer who imported to England a beverage 
called "Advocaat," which consisted of egg yolks, sugar and 
brandewijn.178 This product gained a popular reputation and 
captured a substantial portion of the British market, roughly 
75%.179 The defendants in the action, Keeling, produced a drink 
from a blend of Cyprus sherry and dried eggs, which they adver-
tised and sold on the English market as "Keeling's Old English 
Advocaat."18o Owing to the fact that the defendant's beverage 
was manufactured in England and contained wine instead of 
spirits, the excise duty was appreciably lower than that imposed 
172. [d. at 221. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. at 223. 
175. [d. at 221. 
176. [d. at 223. 
177. App. Cas. 731 (H.L. 1979). 
178. [d. at 734. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. at 735. 
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on the plaintiffs.181 This price differential was passed on to the 
purchaser, for Keeling's product was sold at a lower price of 50p 
per bottle. 182 
When the defendant's sales achieved a strong position in 
the British market, Warnink brought a claim of passing off to 
prohibit the defendant's continued sale of what is more accu-
rately known in England as "egg flip," a beverage consisting of 
virtually the same ingredients as Keeling's Old English 
Advocaat.183 
At the trial court level, the plaintiff's motion for judgment 
was granted, based on a finding that the defendants were mis-
representing their beverage as the genuine Advocaat. l84 How-
ever, the Court of Appeal sought to reverse and the case was 
then sent before the House of Lords.181i On behalf of Warnink, it 
was urged that the plaintiffs relied on the goodwill established in 
the name Advocaat to sustain their dominant position in the 
British market.186 "Such a reputation, having been built up, de-
serves protection and is protected by law . . . Advocaat is a 
word which attracts business."187 Warnink contended that the 
defendant's use of the term Advocaat was a false representation, 
and as such constituted an appropriation of the plaintiff's good-
will for its own advantage in the same market.188 
Although a false representation is the cornerstone for a 
passing off action,189 Lord Diplock restated the requirements 
necessary to sustain an action. These remain the contemporary 
standards: 
181. [d. 
(1) a misrepresentation; (2) made by a trader in 
the course of trade; (3) to prospective customers 
of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services 
supplied by him; (4) which is calculated to injure 
the business or goodwill of another trader (in the 
182. [d. at 734. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. at 732. 
185. [d. 
186. [d. at 735. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. at 736. 
189. [d. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss2/3
1988] APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY 
sense that it is a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a 
business or goodwill of the trader by whom the 
action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will 
probably do SO.190 
327 
The Court of Appeal noted that this action for passing off 
departed from the traditional claim, where a plaintiff seeks to 
prevent a defendant from asserting that his product was in fact 
produced by the plaintiff. lei Here, Warnink confined itself to 
contesting the defendant's marketing of their beverage as "Ad-
vocaat," and did not contend that there was any misrepresenta-
tion as to the actual manufacturing of the beverage.le2 Counsel 
for the respondents urged that the issue before the court was 
one of policy, as the decision involved a choice between whether 
the purchasing public or the long-standing successful 
manufacurer should reap the benefit of judicial protection.le3 
Citing Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, the respondent relied 
on the Singer finding that "[a] trader may lawfully sell a prod-
uct similar in form to that of a rival trader, referring to that 
trader's product by name, so long as he does so in such a way as 
to avoid confusion."le4 
In a concurring opinion, Lord Fraser disposed of the de-
fendant's concern that a manufacturer would be benefitted at 
the expense of the consumer, by noting that "the justification 
for the passing off action to prevent such misreprentation con-
tinuing is not to protect the public (who might suffer no 
prejudice from it, if they had never tasted genuine advocaat) but 
to protect the appellants' property in the goodwill."le& Having 
thereby established the party for whose advantage the action 
was created, the court clarified the policy behind the eventual 
ruling in favor of the plaintiff.le6 The protection of business 
goodwill is not a concern paramount to that of the consumers' 
interests, but is rather a separate and protectable interest be-
190. Id. at 742. 
191. Id. at 751. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 737. 
194. Id. at 738 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 App. Cas. IS, 22, 26-27, 29-30, 36, 
37 -38, 38-39 (1982)). 
195. Id. at 754. 
196. Id. 
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longing to those who established the name sought to be 
appropriated. 197 
The defendant also invoked the argument that protecting 
the plaintiff's right to preserve its reputation could result in 
opening the floodgates to other producers who would inherit a 
portion of the competitive market, having invested nothing to 
warrant the economic benefit.198 Lord Diplock was unconvinced 
and stated: 
The familiar argument that to extend the ambit 
of an actionable wrong beyond that to which ef-
fect has demonstrably been given in the previous 
cases would open the floodgates or, more omi-
nously, a Pandora's box of litigation leaves me 
unmoved when it is sought to be applied to the 
actionable wrong of passing off.loO 
Lord Diplock held for the plaintiff, after finding that the 
prima facie elements for this tort had been proven.200 "Where 
. . . there can be discerned a steady trend in legislation which 
reflects the view of successive Parliaments as to what the public 
interest demands in a particular field of law, ... the common 
law ... ought to proceed upon a parallel rather than a diverging 
course."201 English judges are constrained by precedent to ad-
minister ineffective remedies and have often left the work of 
protection to public authorities. Diplock's holding provides the 
incentive for courts to look beyond the past in formulating their 
opinions. The rigid requirements of passing off weigh heavily 
upon future plaintiffs who wish to gain from an advancement of 
the common law. In the absence of any statutory protection, 
Lord Fraser appealed to the conduct of businessmen in gov-
erning their affairs as a guide to protecting invividual interests 
in the market place. "[A]ny established trader is liable to have 
his goodwill damaged by fair competition, ... [b]ut ... where 
the misrepresentation is likely to cause damage to established 
traders who own goodwill in relation to that class of goods, busi-
197. [d. at 755. 
198. [d. at 739. 
199. [d. at 744. 
200. [d. at 748. 
201. [d. at 743. 
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ness morality seems to require that they should be entitled to 
protect their goodwilL"202 As evidenced by the early professional 
cases, the hope that individual morality will somehow curb the 
acts of appropriation seems wishful thinking. 
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
In sharp contrast to the inability of English law to guard 
against appropriation, protection in the United States is ex-
tremely well developed and effective. However, the United 
States courts, like those of the United Kingdom, were fearful of 
treading into waters without benefit of precedent. The absence 
of well defined claims and remedies did prove daunting to Amer-
ican courts when first confronted with the new breed of legal 
right called privacy.203 It is from this right of privacy that the 
tort of appropriation of name and likeness developed.204 There 
was a steady progression from the privacy tort to the modern 
appeal for the right of publicity.20l! The advent of more advanced 
means of communication and entertainment, which spawned the 
merchandising and advertising industry, fostered the demand 
for commercial protection.206 Appropriation claims are derived 
from the basic right of privacy,207 which will be discussed in the 
context of the contribution which this body of law made to the 
right of publicity. When Louis Nizer, respected American attor-
ney and author, examined the initiative taken by the U.S. 
courts, he correctly analyzed: 
[T]he American courts which have accepted the 
right of privacy as part of their common law have 
acknowledged that they were motivated by an in-
nate feeling of natural justice . . . . The earliest 
English cases avoided any mention of the right of 
privacy and attempted to reach a just result by 
involuted rationalizations and ingenious twisting 
of ill-fitting principles ... [t]he recent matter-of-
fact, unpretentious recognition of the right, how-
202. Id. at 756. 
203. Nizer, The Right of Privacy - A Half Century's Developments 39 MICH. L. REV. 
526, 535-36 (1941). 
204. Prosser, supra note 3, at 401. 
205. Id. at 406-07. 
206. Nizer, supra note 203, at 526. 
207. Prosser, supra note 3, at 401. 
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ever, indicates more than anything else that it has 
become firmly established in our law.20B 
Indeed, this right, which is now taken almost for granted in 
much the same way as the fundamental United States constitu-
tional rights, did not appear in the courtroom until the year 
1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box CO.209 The State of 
New York, which was the jurisdiction in which Roberson was 
tried, enacted a statute which had the effect of classifying as a 
misdemeanor, as well as a tort, the use of the name, portrait or 
picture of any person for "advertising purposes or for the pur-
poses of trade" without written consent.210 It should be noted 
that this statute was limited in effectiveness to situations bear-
ing factual resemblance to the Roberson case, for it did not in 
itself provide for the creation of a right of privacy.211 However, 
Nizer212 mentions that its enactment was a result of the disap-
proval expressed about the Roberson case.213 As Louis Nizer re-
flected: "Designed to fit the facts of one particular case, the stat-
ute has never emerged from its shadow . . . In those states 
which have worked the right of privacy into the fabric of their 
common law, however, it has grown and altered to fit the chang-
ing conditions of modern times."214 Thus, the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Grey met with the approval of the state legislature 
and, as seen in the cases to follow, the courts of other 
jurisdictions. 
The case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Com, 
represents the initial willingness of the courts to add to the com-
mon law a recognized and judicially sanctioned right of privacy. 
This case, tried in the Supreme Court of Georgia, dealt with a 
newspaper advertisement for defendant's corporation, the New 
England Mutual Life Insurance Company.216 Included in the ad-
vertisement was a likeness of the plaintiff, a private individual 
by the name of Paolo Pavesich, which was placed next to a pho-
208. Nizer, supra note 203, at 535-36. 
209. 171 N.Y. 538,64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
210. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-1 (Conso!. 1903). 
211. Nizer, supra note 203, at 538. 
212. American attorney and renowned legal author. 
213. Nizer, supra note 203, at 538. 
214. [d. at 538-39. 
215. 50 S.E. 68 (1905). 
216. [d. 
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tograph which depicted a poor and unhealthy person.217 Under-
neath was a caption which illustrated the contrast between the 
photographs by stating: "[t]hese two pictures tell their own 
story."218 A quotation was attributed to the plaintiff, under his 
picture, which claimed that he was enjoying the receipt of divi-
dends from an insurance policy with defendant's company.219 
Another caption referred to the poor individual who, by not fol-
lowing the plaintiff's example, was now destitute.22o The picture 
of the plaintiff which appeared in the advertisements was made 
without his knowledge or consent.221 The claim brought by the 
plaintiff to protect his right of privacy was predicated on his in-
sistence that as an individual member of society he was entitled 
to control the use for which his likeness was taken.222 The court 
contended that the plaintiff was not surrendering his personal 
liberty in exchange for the benefits conferred by society.223 The 
court further stated that natural law should prevail, in the ab-
sence of precedent, to afford protection to individuals who suffer 
unauthorized exploitation of their likenesses, as personal dignity 
is harmed.224 The court interpreted the plea that natural law 
should find expression in the judiciary to mean that "[w]hen the 
law guarantees to one the right to the enjoyment of his life, it 
gives to him something more than the mere right to breathe and 
exist. "2211 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution, 
freedom of speech, was mentioned as an important right which 
should be accorded the highest degree of protection in U.S. ju-
risprudence.226 However, for purposes of the appropriation of 
name and likeness rights the Constitution does not forgive or 
sanction such unauthorized taking of one's name or likeness if 
accomplished for private commercial gain.227 "There is in the 
publication of one's picture for advertising purposes not the 
217. Id. 




222. Id. at 70. 
223. Id. at 69. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 70. 
226. Id. at 74. 
227. Id. 
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slightest semblance of an expression of an idea, a thought, or an 
opinion, within the meaning of the constitutional provision 
which guarantees to a person the right to publish his sentiments 
on any subject."228 For this reason the court was able to concen-
trate on the legal wrong committed by the defendant in using 
the plaintiff's photograph to promote the sale of life 
insurance.229 
Judge Cobb, in formulating his opinion, made reference to 
the Roberson case, and the argument advanced in that case, that 
to allow recovery for an invasion of the right of privacy would 
open the floodgates of litigation.230 Cobb found that this concern 
was not a sufficient reason for denying legal redress to aggrieved 
plaintiffs.2S1 Thus, the right of privacy was afforded the same 
right to enforcement as traditional claims brought, for example, 
under the contract theory.2S2 Cobb ascribed the reluctance of 
judges to accept a right of privacy to the belief that, because the 
cases before them were unique factually, the right was perceived 
not to exist.233 Cobb's reasoning, as applied in the Pavesich case, 
stands in marked opposition to the Roberson holding. Referring 
to the photographs in the advertisement, Judge Cobb stated: 
"The defendant insurance company and its agent had no more 
authority to display them in public for the purpose of advertis-
ing the business in which they were engaged than they would 
have had to compel the plaintiff to place himself upon exhibi-
tion for this purpose. "234 
The factual similarity of the Roberson and Pavesich cases 
makes it clear that the holding which provided recovery in the 
latter instance could have easily been granted to the Roberson 
plaintiff. In the three years between these two cases, the law had 
undergone a metamorphosis in which precedent was discarded 
to accommodate the need for recognition of this important right. 
The development of the privacy right from its genesis in the ar-
ticle by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis to its final 
228. [d. at 80. 
229. [d. 
230. [d. at 77. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. at 80. 
233. [d. at 77. 
234. [d. at 79. 
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expression by Judge Cobb spanned sixteen years. This cause of 
action has exerted a strong impact in American jurisprudence, as 
evidenced by the vast number of cases currently litigated under 
this right. It is almost unthinkable that plaintiffs were ever de-
nied the ability to advocate their commercial appropriation 
claims. This surprise is expressed in the language used by Judge 
Cobb when giving judgment for the plaintiff: 
So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recog-
nizes, within proper limits, as a legal right, the 
right of privacy, and that the publication of one's 
picture without his consent by another as an ad-
vertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing 
the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an inva-
sion of this right, that we venture to predict that 
the day will come that the American bar will mar-
vel that a contrary view was ever entertained by 
judges of eminence and ability, just as in the pre-
sent day we stand amazed that . . . Lord Hale, 
with perfect composure of manner and complete 
satisfaction of soul, imposed the death penalty for 
witchcraft upon ignorant and harmless women.2311 
Having denounced the decision in Roberson, the court es-
tablished the right of privacy as a firmly rooted legal princi-
ple.286 Historically, Pavesich is cited as the leading case.287 How-
ever, once the right of privacy was recognized in the United 
States, the new tort required further definition and polish. Dean 
Prosser, former dean of the University of California at Berkeley, 
School of Law (Boalt Hall), writing in 1960,238 elaborated on the 
then comparatively novel tort, and found that it comprised not 
one but rather four distinct interests.239 In spite of the fact that 
each interest shares the title "privacy," the rights which flow to 
a plaintiff are independent under each type of invasion.240 The 
privacy right is divided into four separate torts.241 Dean Prosser 
described those torts as follows: 
235. [d. at 80-81. 
236. [d. at 81. 
237. Prosser, supra note 3, at 386; Nizer, supra note 203, at 535; Nimmer, The 
Right Of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). 
238. Prosser, supra note 3, at 383. 
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1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or soli-
tude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts 
about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, 
of the plaintiff's name or likeness.242 
This classification provides a variety of causes of action. While 
an acknowledgment of each tort is important to a discussion of 
the development of the right of privacy, the final category, in-
volving appropriation, is the focus of this inquiry. The issues to 
follow will be limited to the appropriation concerns. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY 
To establish an appropriation, a plaintiff must prove that 
his name or likeness has been taken by a defendant for the de-
fendant's commercial advantage.248 With respect to the taking of 
an individual's name, Prosser has distinguished economic gain 
from harmless use: "Unless there is some tortious use made of it, 
anyone can be given or assume any name he likes. The 
Kabotznicks may call themselves Cabots, and the Lovelskies be-
come the Lowells, and the ancient proper Bostonian houses can 
do nothing about it but grieve."244 Once it is established that a 
name or likeness was taken for its value as a commodity, the 
next step is to prove that exploitation occurred for the benefit of 
a Defendant.2411 In most instances, the benefit is a monetary 
gain, or the furthering of a business or commercial interest. This 
aspect separates appropriation from the other three privacy 
torts, for the interest sought to be protected is not freedom from 
personal affronts but freedom from a proprietary taking.246 In-
deed, while a plaintiff might feel that his dignity or pride has 
been wounded, this injury is secondary to the loss of capita1.247 
For example, celebrities frequently object to the taking of what 
242. Id. 
243. [d. 
244. [d. at 403. 
245. [d. at 405. 
246. [d. at 406. 
247. Rader, supra note I, at 232. 
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is termed their "right of publicity."248 Although the Pavesich 
case guaranteed that a right to privacy would be judicially pro-
tected, the doctrine of appropriation required expansion to meet 
the needs of a technologically advanced society.249 While private 
individuals had the ability to prevent invasion, relief was needed 
for those in the public eye who sought to exclude others from 
gratuitously taking their notoriety.2l1o The right to publicity was 
therefore a logical development from the right to privacy.2111 The 
recognition of a right of privacy provided a solid foundation for 
recognition of the right of publicity.m The influence of Warren 
and Justice Brandeis was important to development of a right of 
publicity.m Mention of this fact was made by Bloustein, Profes-
sor of Law at New York University School of Law, when he ad-
vances the proposition that publicity rights are the beneficiaries 
of the advances made by the tort doctrine of privacy: 
[T]he very characterization of these cases as in-
volving a "right to publicity" disguises the impor-
tant fact that name and likeness can only begin to 
command a commercial price in a society which 
recognizes that thefe is a right to p,rivacy, a right 
to control the conditions under which name and 
likeness may be used.2&' 
This suggests that the need for commercial protection is 
distinct from the need for privacy.21111 In economic terms, licenses 
which grant the use of a likeness for publicity purposes negate 
the tort of privacy altogether.m Put another way, the right of 
publicity is the legal status which allows the right of privacy to 
be made into a commodity and sold.m The difference between 
these interests has been aptly described by the renowned legal 
commentator Rader: 
248. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 203. 
249. [d. 
250. Berkman, The Right of Publicity - Protection For Public Figures and Celebri-
ties, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 533 (1976). 
251. Rader, supra note I, at 228. 
252. [d. at 229. 
253. Prosser, supra note 3, at 383. 
254. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
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For 'right of privacy' actions, the injured party at-
tempts to stop the publication of the damaging 
material whereas a 'right of publicity' plaintiff 
may not object to the commercial use of his name 
or likeness so long as it is or becomes authorized 
and he is paid for the use .... A private individ-
ual, not a celebrity, fails to create a tangible and 
saleable product by associating his name or like-
ness with the product because his name or like-
ness does not ordinarily have commercial value.268 
The development of the entertainment industry creates a 
capacity to produce revenue which could not have been antici-
pated when the tort of privacy was first envisioned.2119 As a result 
of the rapid progress in communications, the effectiveness of the 
privacy right has decreased.260 
Those who have carefully nurtured a career dependent upon 
public popularity should be entitled to preserve financial gains 
accruing from publicity.261 Public interest is a vital ingredient to 
sustaining popularity, whether one is a recording artist or a 
prominent athletic figure. 262 Like a lawyer who receives remu-
neration in exchange for legal advice, the labor invested by a 
celebrity should be rewarded by safeguarding the profits which 
flow from advertising and other exploitation of his or her person 
for economic gain.268 
The right to publicity was discussed in the case of Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum. Inc. 264 The case in-
volved two competing manufacturers of chewing gum.2611 The 
plaintiff promoted his product by entering into exclusive con-
tracts with famous baseball players which enabled him to mar-
ket their photographs in association with the sale of his gum.266 
258. Rader, supra note 1, at 232-33. 
259. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 216. 
262. Id. at 217. 
263. Id. 
264. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
265. Id. at 867. 
266. Id. 
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In America, it is extremely popular for children to collect 
baseball cards. These cards include, on one side, a photograph of 
a player in uniform, and on the back information relating to the 
individual player's career. Such cards are sold in packets which 
contain chewing gum and provide a strong incentive to purchase 
a particular brand. Through an assignment, the defendant in 
Haelan received the right to use the baseball players' photo-
graphs in connection with the sale of his competing brand.267 At 
trial, counsel for the defendant maintained that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to recovery under the right of privacy, because, as a 
personal right, it was non-assignable.266 The defendant further 
suggested that the plaintiff's contract amounted only to a release 
which for the term of the contract precluded the player from 
suing the plaintiff for invasion.269 The court conceded that the 
right of privacy vested exclusively in the baseball player but 
nevertheless recognized the right to publicity: 
We think that, in addition to and independent of 
that right of privacy. . . a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to 
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his pic-
ture, and that such a grant may validly be made 
"in gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer 
of a business or of anything else. Whether it be 
labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here, 
as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply 
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim 
which has pecuniary worth. This right might be 
called a "right of publicity" [and] [t]his right of 
publicity would usually yield them no money un-
less it could be made the subject of an exclusive 
grant which barred any other advertiser from us-
ing their pictures.27o 
The Haelan court distinguished the right of publicity from 
the right to privacy.271 Judge Frank noted for example that pub-
licity rights are assignable.272 It is that which makes it possible 
for a celebrity to control the profitability of his name and like-
267. Id. at 869. 
268. Id. at 867. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 868. 
271. Id. 
272. [d. at 869. 
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ness in the competitive marketplace of merchandising and en-
dorsements.278 With the often abrupt changes in public trends 
and the relatively short careers of athletes and celebrities it is 
vital, in the absence of career security, to provide such individu-
als with the bargaining power necessary to the granting of 
licenses.274 
The advertising industry is an important secondary market 
for public figures. 2711 The substantial income generated in the 
area is an important consideration for those involved in the en-
tertainment and sports industries.278 As one legal writer noted, 
"the notion that, absent some compelling public interest, people 
are entitled to the benefits of their efforts was an important jus-
tification for the expansion of the initial privacy model of the 
tort. "277 
Additionally, an increased control on the standard of adver-
tising content would result if public figures were provided with 
the ability to bargain for the use of their names and like-
nesses.278 The commercial industry has capitalized on the appeal 
of endorsements, which often result in increased consumption.279 
Many individuals decide to buy a product simply by the vir-
tue of the fact that a film star or athlete has appeared with it.280 
The reasons for the success of a product may be as varied as the 
items themselves.281 One explanation for this psychological phe-
nomenon may be a subconscious desire to associate with the ce-
lebrity, using the most instantly available method at hand: i.e., 
select the product enjoyed by that star.282 Another more nega-
tive incentive may be a public belief that the promotion is a 
warranty.283 This is most likely to occur when the product adver-
273. Id. at 868. 
274. Berkman, supra note 250, at 537. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 533. 
277. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of 
Famous Trade Symbols, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 41, 65 (1984). 
278. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histo-
ries, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973). 
279. Id. at 644. 
280. Id. at 645. 
281. Id. at 646. 
282. Id. at 645. 
283. Id. 
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tised is within the same area in which the celebrity achieved dis-
tinction.284 Consumers may therefore be misled into purchasing 
inferior products simply because such items are used by figures 
who command respect. The potential for this type of abuse pro-
vides an additional incentive to celebrities who, by withholding 
permission, may prevent their names or likenesses from being 
misused for promotional purposes.281\ This view was elucidated 
in a law review article: 
If society chooses to allow uses of names and like-
ness in advertising, it might prefer that consum-
ers not be misled about the willingness of a celeb-
rity to associate himself with a product or service. 
Similarly, society might decide that the "emulat-
ing" behavior of consumers would channel itself 
more acceptably if the persons emulated had 
some control over the decision to link their names 
and likenesses with particular products.286 
Consumers as well as public figures would be benefitted by 
such control, for it would provide celebrities with a stronger po-
sition when negotiating with those wishing to use their fame for 
commercial purposes. Additionally, if the product to be sold is in 
conflict with the aims or beliefs of the celebrity, or is unfit for 
sale, the use of name and likeness could be denied altogether.287 
The recognition of a right of publicity as a property right was 
imperative if worthwhile controls were to be placed on the ad-
vertising and merchandising industries.288 
The conflict and uncertainty exhibited by American courts 
who grappled with the fundamental disctinction between a ce-
lebrity's right of privacy and the right to publicity is expressed 
in the cases to follow. Although the Haelan decision is impor-
tant insofar as it designated publicity as a separate property 
right, much confusion reigned in subsequent cases. Complica-
tions in judicial reasoning could have been avoided if Haelan 
had been strictly followed. Yet, as Professor Nimmer points out 
"by the very nature of our judicial process, a new principle of 
284. [d. 
285. [d. at 647. 
286. [d. 
287. [d. at 642-43. 
288. [d. at 647. 
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law can never be completely embodied in anyone decision."289 
The right of publicity is frequently raised when the courts are 
presented with public figure plaintiffs.290 This right is extremely 
useful: it encompasses not merely a claim for remuneration for 
unauthorized use of name and likeness, but recompense for the 
affront to personal dignity.291 
Often a celebrity's image will be inconsistent with the prod-
uct for which his likeness is used. For this reason "[t]he eco-
nomic injury, resulting from an appropriation of a celebrity's 
identity should not obscure the concurrent harm to personal in-
tegrity and autonomy."292 The distinction between a celebrity's 
identity and the product for which his likeness was used, formed 
the basis of the plaintiff's claim in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales CO.293 
The parties were characterized in a unique manner by 
Judge Hutcheson: "Plaintiff, in physique as in prowess as a 
hurler, a modern David, is a famous football player. Defendant, 
in bulk, if not in brass and vulnerability, a modern Goliath, is a 
distributor of Pabst beer."294 In 1939, Davy O'Brien was selected 
to pose as the most popular football player of the year for pub-
licity pictures to be taken by his university.2911 The defendant, in 
an effort to increase sales, produced a football calendar in which 
the plaintiff's photograph appeared accompanied by the words 
"Pabst [f]amous [b]lue [r]ibbon [b]eer."296 
As a member of an organization called "[T]he Allied Youth 
of America," O'Brien used his fame to promote the organiza-
tion's theme, which discouraged the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages.297 The plaintiff had been approached on several occa-
sions with offers to endorse various alcoholic drinks, but he con-
sistently refused.298 After learning of the association of his pho-
289. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 222. 
290. Hefter & Besha, Character Merchandising in the USA: A Search for Definable 
Remedies and a Warning of Potential Liability, INDUS. PROP. L. 592 (1978). 
291. Denicola, supra note 277, at 66. 
292. Id. 
293. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). 




298. Id. at 169. 
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tograph with a nationwide advertisement for beer, he brought a 
claim for invasion of privacy against the defendant.299 The hold-
ing, rendered in favor of the defendant, relied upon the proposi-
tion that as the most publicized player, O'Brien had impliedly 
waived any right of privacy.300 The court determined this by the 
fact that over 800 photographs of the plaintiff were provided to 
magazines without his objection.301 O'Brien's contention that the 
calendar would suggest to the public that the players listed were 
sanctioning the consumption of beer was found by the court to 
be lacking in merit.302 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes found that the de-
fendant was in fact liable for appropriating the plaintiff's prop-
erty right by using his photograph for the purpose of advertis-
ing.303 Relying upon the standard practices engaged in by 
advertising companies, who frequently offered substantial mone-
tary incentives for the use of famous players likenesses, Holmes 
decried the plight of those like the plaintiff who were left with-
out legal redress:304 "The decision of the majority leaves the ap-
pellant without remedy for any non-libelous use made of his pic-
ture by advertisers of beer, wine, whisky, patent medicines, or 
other non-contraband goods, wares, and merchandise. It also 
places every other famous stage, screen and athletic star in the 
same situation."30I1 This may seem late when one notes that the 
first mention of the need for privacy occurred in what may only 
be described as a landmark article, The Right To Privacy,306 
published in 1890. This article was motivated by the newspaper 
practice of engaging in gossip which exposed the personal idio-
syncrasies and habits of the wealthy.307 
In particular, the newspapers of Boston chose to write in 
glaring detail about the parties given by Mrs. Samuel D. War-
ren.308 William Prosser described the events which inspired War-
299. [d. at 168. 
300. [d. at 169. 
301. [d. 
302. [d. 
303. [d. at 171. 
304. [d. 
305. [d. 
306. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
307. [d. at 196. 
308. Prosser, supra note 3, at 383. 
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ren and Brandeis to advocate so vigorously the need for a recog-
nized right of privacy: 
It was the era of "Yellow Journalism," when the 
press had begun to resort to excesses in the way 
of prying that have become more or less common-
place today; and Boston was perhaps, of all the 
cities in the country, the one in which a lady and 
a gentleman kept their names and their personal 
affairs out of the papers. The matter came to a 
head when the newspapers had a field day on the 
occasion of the wedding of a daughter, and Mr. 
Warren became annoyed. It was an annoyance for 
which the press, the advertisers and the en-
tertainment industry were to pay dearly over the 
next 70 years.309 
The article, produced by two of America's most famous at-
torneys, Warren and Brandeis, launched a fervent attack on the 
press for failing to be an impartial observer in the recording of 
events.3lO Their article generated the spirit needed to protect in-
dividuals from unwanted injection into the public forum: 
The press is overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gos-
sip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the 
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued 
with industry as well as effrontery . . . . No en-
thusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can 
survive under its blighting influence.3ll 
In formulating the argument in favor of creating a privacy 
right, Warren and Brandeis looked at two English cases, the first 
of which is Prince Albert v. Strange.312 The facts of this 1849 
case involved a request by the Prince that the defendant be en-
joined from placing on exhibition and offering for sale a catalog 
containing etchings made by the Queen and Prince for their own 
amusement.313 The defendant allegedly came into posession of 
the prints when an employee of the royal printer made impres-
309. [d. 
310. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 306, at 196. 
311. [d. 
312. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849). 
313. [d. 
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sions of the etchings.3a Although the defendant denied that his 
possession of the works occurred through surreptitious means, 
the court enjoined the exhibition, but did not disturb the publi-
cation of the catalog. m In spite of defendant's willingness to re-
turn all the etchings in his possession and, "as a loyal and duti-
ful subject, in every respect comply with the wishes of the 
Queen,"316 he insisted upon the right to reproduce the catalog.317 
On behalf of the Prince, the solicitor general argued: "The inter-
ference of the [c]ourt is not asked for in this case on the ground 
of decorum or good taste, but on the general principle that this 
[c]ourt will protect every person in the free and innocent use of 
his own property."318 Warren and Brandeis, in their enthusiasm 
to find initial stirrings of the privacy doctrine in the English 
courts, appear to have grasped the reasoning in the Prince Al-
bert case too tightly. The opinion addresses the propriety of 
maintaining protection for property rights with some ancillary 
discussion of the breach of confidence in the printer's work-
men.319 Indeed, while privacy may have been what Prince Albert 
sought to protect via the injunction, the means by which he 
achieved it remain within the context of a property right.320 A 
similar view was taken in measuring the relative importance ac-
corded to the case: "Warren and Brandeis discerned in this deci-
sion 'merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general 
right of the individual to be left alone' but ... the decision is 
based mainly on the right of property which the plaintiff had in 
the prints. "321 
The next English case the American courts relied on to sup-
port the proposition that privacy was an interest worthy of pro-
tection was Pollard v. Photographic Co. m This action, tried in 
1888, was brought against the Photographic Company for the 
unauthorized use of the plaintiff's photograph in an advertise-
ment.323 The plaintiff, Mrs. Pollard, entered defendant's store 
314. [d. at 1172. 
315. [d. at 1173. 
316. [d. at 1174. 
317. [d. 
31S. [d. at 1175. 
319. [d. 
320. [d. at 1176. 
321. R. Wachs, supra note 106, at 5. 
322. 60 L.T.R. 41S (1SSS). 
323. [d. at 419. 
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with the intention of having several photographs taken of her-
self.324 Without her authorization, the plaintiff's portrait was 
displayed in the defendant's store window.8211 At trial, the de-
fendant's argument that a photographic negative is the property 
of the photographer and available for his use in the absence of 
illegal acts such as libel or slander failed.326 Judge North, in de-
livering his opinion, analogized the relationship between cus-
tomer and photographer to that of attorney and client.327 He 
claimed that an element of confidentiality existed in both rela-
tionships.32B By reproducing for his own use photographs taken 
from the plaintiff's portrait, the defendant was, in the judge's 
opinion, liable for breach of faith.S29 Additionally, the opinion 
illustrated the belief that, absent an express agreement between 
the photographer and his subjects, prints taken without consent 
amounted to a breach of contract.330 The description of the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant in this case 
would appear to designate the abuse as existing exclusively 
within the realm of either contract or trust. However, the read-
ing of the Pollard case by Warren and Brandeis would suggest 
that the legal terms "trust" and "contract" were used to denote 
a privacy interest. Failing to ascertain any evidence of the pri-
vacy doctrine in English law, Warren and Brandeis, discussing 
Pollard remarked, "since the latest advances in photographic art 
have rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously, the 
doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the 
required protection and the law of tort must be resorted to."SS1 
The lack of precedent in England did not inhibit Warren 
and Brandeis, who argued that a new approach was needed if 
American jurisprudence were to provide an effective method of 
protection against invasions of privacy.332 But, a reluctance to 
depart from the status quo was clear in the first few cases which 
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these cases was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box CO.333 tried 
in 1902. The case involved an ordinary individual, Abigail M. 
Roberson, who sued the defendant for using her photograph 
without permission in an advertisement for his product, baking 
flour. 334 The Franklin Mills Co. reproduced the plaintiff's photo-
graph on cartons of flour with a caption which read "[f]lour of 
the [f]amily."33& Below this caption, in smaller print, appeared 
the name of the second defendant: "Rochester Folding Box Co, 
Rochester, NY. "336 
The use of Miss Roberson's likeness produced an immediate 
physical reaction in the plaintiff, subsequently diagnosed as ner-
vous shock.337 Due to the overt display of the defendant's prod-
uct in stores, markets and other areas to which the public was 
admitted, the photograph was recognized by friends and ac-
quaintances of the plaintiff.338 It was later discovered that her 
photograph appeared on at least 25,000 cartons marketed 
throughout America and internationally.339 The plaintiff re-
quested a permanent injunction as well as $15,000 damages.34o 
The court recognized that the plaintiff's complaint was predi-
cated on a new, as yet unrecognized right.341 The judge held in 
favor of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of precedent for 
his decision.342 The court found that the defendant's use of her 
likeness for economic advantage in furthering its own business 
interests constituted an invasion of her privacy right, which the 
court characterized as "the right to be let alone. "343 
On appeal, Justice Parker reversed the lower court's holding 
on the theory that it was the province of the legislature to enact 
such a novel principle and not that of the court which must 
abide by previous decisions. 344 Mention was also made of the 
early English cases, which do not themselves provide a recogni-
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tion of the right of privacy. Fearful that the floodgates would be 
open to a plethora of claims if a ruling for the plaintiff were 
granted, the court refused to recognize a right of privacy.s4& 
Louis Nizer, a U.S. attorney best known for his legal writing, 
astutely commented on the rationale behind Justice Parker's 
holding: "The reason for the court's r~ling was its fear that the 
recognition of the right of privacy would result in a deluge of 
litigation which would make it impossible to prevent the doc-
trine from being extended step by step until it embraced all 
sorts of absurdities."S4& Justice Parker attempted to mitigate the 
harshness of his decision by directing counsel to the penal code 
section 242, which contains sanctions for malicious publica-
tion.347 This may provide a civil remedy at common law or allow 
the instigation of criminal proceedings for cases involving the 
publication of a photograph if the plaintiff is able to prove that 
the material constituted a libel. 348 This attempt to soften his 
judgment was meaningless, for it was asserted at trial that the 
plaintiff was not libeled by the photograph. S49 Indeed, due to the 
quality of the likeness the plaintiff's friends were able to identify 
Miss Roberson as the face in the advertisement. m 
The case contains an agressive dissent by Justice Grey who 
argued that the plaintiff had suffered a serious wrong which 
should be remedied if not at law then in equity.3&l Courts of eq-
uity were created for instances such as this, where one seeking 
redress was unable to formulate a claim recognizable at law.m 
Justice Grey found it unthinkable that protection could be af-
forded in Prince Albert and Pollard on the basis of a property 
claim, while it was denied in the present action. S&S He noted 
that, in Roberson, the defendant's acts were just as reprehensi-
ble as if they had taken for their own monetary gain a writing or 
etching created by the plaintiff.su As to the inability of the com-
mon law to provide redress for actions such as those of the de-
345. [d. 
346. Nizer, supra note 203, at 532. 
347. Roberson, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
348. [d. 
349. [d. at 442. 
350. [d. 
351. [d. at 449. 
352. [d. 
353. [d. at 451. 
354. [d. at 450. 
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fendant, Justice Grey stated: 
It would be a reproach to equitable jurisprudence 
if equity were powerless to extend the application 
of the principles of common law or of natural jus-
tice in remedying a wrong, which, in the progress 
of civilization, has been made possible as the re-
sult of new social or commercial conditions.m 
347 
After Roberson a strong sentiment developed that it was un-
conscionable for the law to turn its back on a plaintiff who, like 
Abigail Roberson, suffered embarrassment and illness due to the 
wrongful taking of her likeness.3116 The time was ripe to develop 
new legal remedies. The effect of the decision had almost instan-
taneous impact.3117 
Public figures litigating claims based on the right of privacy 
were to encounter substantial difficulty because of the courts 
holding that notoriety constituted an implied waiver.3118 This 
twist in judicial reasoning proved daunting to those who, like 
Davey O'Brien having developed a public image, were to be de-
nied the opportunity to litigate on the issue of privacy. Justice 
Holmes, in his dissenting opinion theorized that, in renouncing 
his right of privacy, the plaintiff received in exchange a right to 
publicity.m 
Since publicity is, after Haelan, considered to be a property 
right, a celebrity's control over the use of his likeness would re-
main inviolate from defenses raised by defendants such as 
Pabst. 
Turning from the athletic sphere to that of the motion pic-
ture industry, the case of Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press360 
illustrates that film stars are also without legal protection in liti-
gating under the guise of privacy. This case was brought by Par-
amount Studios to enjoin the defendant from manufacturing 
355. [d. at 449. 
356. Yang, Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American Law, 15 II'/T'L 
& COMPo L.Q. 175, 181 (1966). 
357. [d. 
358. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204. 
359. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). 
360. 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939). 
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and offering for sale items which related to films produced by 
them,S81 Counsel for the plaintiff urged that advertising is an im-
portant tool which, if correctly executed, communicates to the 
public information which is calculated to ensure star status to 
their actors,882 The products sold by Leader Press were de-
scribed by the plaintiff as follows: "[T]hey, [defendants] incor-
porate therein pictures, cartoons, and caricatures of the stars 
and featured players . . . in an inartistic, grotesque and inferior 
manner."888 In particular, the plaintiff objected to a picture of 
Claudette Colbert, which the defendant produced following her 
performance as Cleopatra.884 Due to poor workmanship, Miss 
Colbert's head appeared to be that of a negress.886 In granting 
judgment for Paramount, the court found that the defendant's 
sale of items to film theaters had induced a breach of the con-
tract between the plaintiff and its exhibitors.888 By entering the 
public forum as a famous actress, Miss Colbert's only claim 
could have been based on the right of publicity, for like Davey 
O'Brien, notoriety would have precluded recovery on an action 
to preserve her privacy.887 
The decisions continued to represent a growing judicial un-
certainty regarding application of the right of privacy in the con-
text of a celebrity,88S The distinction between the right to be left 
alone as advanced by Justices Warren and Brandeis, and the 
prevention of appropriation through the right of publicity re-
mained unclear.s89 In cases where a public figure was granted 
judgment, the courts appeared to arbitrarily select one of the 
two rights.870 The case brought by Muhammad Ali against 
Playgirl magazine appealed for recognition of both of these 
rights.871 
Muhammad Ali, until his defeat by Leon Spinks, was the 
361. Id. at 230. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 231. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 232. 
367. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 205. 
368. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 204. 
369. Berkman, supra note 250, at 527. 
370. Id. 
371. Ali v. Playgirl Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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heavyweight boxing champion of the world.872 He sued Playgirl 
magazine for using a portrait in its February 1978 issue which 
depicted a black man sitting in the corner of a boxing ring wear-
ing nothing but tape on his hands.878 Although the portrait was 
an illustration not a photograph, the physical resemblance to Ali 
was undisputed.874 The caption underneath read "Mystery 
Man,"8711 and was followed by a line which referred to the figure 
as "The Greatest."87S The court took judicial notice of Ali's suc-
cessful efforts to characterize himself in the media as "the great-
est" by referring to the cover of Time magazine, issued after the 
Ali-Spinks fight, which read" 'The Greatest' is [g]one."877 
Muhammad Ali alleged that the defendant was liable for in-
vading both his statutory right of privacy as well as his common 
law right to publicity.378 Following the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, counsel for the defense moved that, despite cessation 
of distribution of the issue in the domestic market, sales of the 
magazine be allowed to continue in England.879 In support of its 
motion, the defendant claimed that the right of privacy was in-
applicable to the plaintiff who as a public figure was not entitled 
to invoke the protection offered under the privacy statute. 880 
Judge Gagliardi resolved the issue by holding that Ali's sta-
tus as a celebrity did not prevent him from asserting a right to 
privacy under New York statutory law.381 "That [plaintiff] may 
have voluntarily on occasion surrendered [his] privacy, for a 
price or gratuitously, does not forever forfeit for anyone's com-
mercial profit so much of [his] privacy as [he] has not relin-
quished."882 This decision clearly acknowledged that if one ven-
tures into the public view, there is still a concurrent right to 
keep private certain aspects of one's personal life which, if made 
available for comment, would result in an abuse of personal dig-
372. [d. at 725 n.!. 
373. [d. at 725-26. 
374. [d. at 726. 
375. [d. at 726-27. 
376. [d. at 727. 
377. [d. at 727 n.8. 
378. [d. at 726. 
379. [d. at 730. 
380. [d. at 727. 
381. [d. at 728. 
382. Id. at 727 (citing Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D. 2d 343, 351-52, 223 
N.Y.S. 2d 737, 745 (1962)). 
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nity.S8S Thus, public celebrities are, under the Ali decision, able 
to claim the same right to privacy as any other private 
individual. 
In addressing the plaintiff's second claim, that the publica-
tion of his likeness was a violation of his right to publicity, 
Judge Gagliardi noted that most New York courts do not distin-
guish the property right of publicity from privacy claims. S84 The 
right to publicity was described as analogous to the concept of 
goodwill developed by a company.m In granting the plaintiff's 
right to protect this interest, Gagliardi reflected that his judg-
ment was "the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrich-
ment by the theft of good will [sic]."s88 The holding in this case 
accommodated a finding that the portrait amounted to the un-
lawful appropriation of Muhammad Ali's likenesss87 as well as 
an invasion of his separate and distinct right to privacy. S88 
Not all courts have recognized the theory that publicity and 
privacy rights may be mutually exclusive for purposes of adjudi-
cation.s89 The lack of independent analysis accorded to each in-
terest does not always result in a disadvantage to plaintiffs who 
are seeking to vindicate their claims for legal protection. S90 
In Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises Inc.,s91 four well-
known professional golfers brought an action for injunction 
against the defendant who, in marketing a board game, used the 
plaintiffs' names in association with an advertisement.s92 The 
game consisted of "profiles and playing charts" which specified 
biographical information about inter alia, the four plaintiffs. S9S 
In spite of the fact that the information used by Schon horn En-
terprises was accurate, the defendant did not obtain consent 
383. [d. at 728. 
384. [d. 
385. [d. 
386. [d. at 728-29 (citing Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis 
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)). 
387. [d. at 729. 
388. [d. at 728. 
389. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter. Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). 
390. [d. at 462. 
391. [d. at 458. 
392. [d. at 459. 
393. [d. 
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prior to production and distribution of the game.394 The defend-
ant's failure to comply with a request by the plaintiffs that they 
be disassociated with the product resulted in litigation.39& At 
trial, it was conceded by the defendants that the use of the golf-
ers' names increased the sales potential of the game.398 For their 
part, the plaintiffs urged that the unwarranted taking of their 
names not only reduced their potential to receive remuneration 
from other manufacturers, but also infringed their right to pri-
vacy.39? Predictably, defense counsel argued that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to a right of privacy since their entry into a 
professional sport operated as a waiver.398 Schonhorn also main-
tained that the information used by them in the game was "pub-
lic data and available to all, it should not be denied the privilege 
of reproducing that which is set forth in newspapers, magazine 
articles and other periodicals. "399 
In his opinion, Judge Horn recognized that the act of repub-
lishing biographical information regarding a celebrity was within 
the protection afforded by the first amendment of the United 
States Constitution, and was not a violation of privacy in a strict 
sense!OO The plaintiffs' complaint, however, alleged that the de-
fendant's use of the information was to further its own pecuni-
ary advantage in a commercial market.401 
Schonhorn's appropriation was thus viewed as an impedi-
ment to the free enjoyment of profit which should flow to the 
plaintiffs as a result of effort expended in the golfing profes-
sion!02 Judge Horn's view in granting judgment for the plaintiffs 
was that a contrary ruling would prove fundamentally unfair!03 
As noted by one legal writer: "Fortunately, the court did not 
commit the further error of proclaiming that public figures sacri-
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raphies, thereby precluding any relief."404 By permitting the 
plaintiffs to recover in spite of their standing as celebrities, the 
privacy doctrine was, in this instance, expanded to include the 
right to publicity.m Here, a monetary interest was protected not 
as a property right, but under the belief that public figures do 
not sacrifice their privacy even in a commercial context.4°6 Al-
though as far as the plaintiffs were concerned, the ends justified 
the means, the court neglected to seize the chance to distinguish 
between a property, as opposed to a personal, right. Three years 
later, a strikingly similar fact situation arose. 
In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,407 the plaintiff sued on behalf 
of all major league baseball players to enjoin the defendant from 
using their names in the production of two board games called 
"Big League Manager Baseball"408 and "Negamco's Major 
League Baseball."409 These games used information concerning 
500-700 baseball players from the major leagues.41o The action 
was formally brought by an association which represented the 
collective interests of over 850 players, and was responsible for 
negotiating, licensing and marketing contracts as well as group 
endorsements.411 At the time of the action over 27 licensing 
agreements were in force, four or five of which were with distrib-
utors of products similar to those manufactured by the defend-
ant.412 These agreements produced revenue for the players; the 
evidence established that in the previous year alone the total in-
come realized from such ventures exceeded $400,000.413 
After informing Henricksen that his products constituted an 
appropriation of a property right, the association offered to 
enter into a standard licensing contract.H4 The action arose out 
of the defendant's unwillingness to either withdraw the games 
from the consumer market or to be party to a recognized agree-
404. Berkman, supra note 250, at 537. 
405. Palmer, 232 A.2d at 462. 
406. [d. at 461. 
407. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
408. [d. at 1278. 
409. [d. 
410. [d. 
411. [d. at 1278-79. 
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ment.4111 The defendant claimed that, as public figures, the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to invoke the right of privacy, and 
that by charging a licensing fee of $2,500 the plaintiff was at-
tempting "to keep little people out of the business."H6 Henrick-
sen's effort to escape liability on the basis that the privacy tort 
was unavailable to professional sportsmen failed. m This defense 
was ineffective because the ground upon which relief was sought 
by the plaintiff was "misappropriation and use for commercial 
profit of the names of professional major league baseball players 
without the payment of royalties."418 The court distinguished 
rights involving privacy from those relating to a proprietary in-
terest.H9 The contention that a celebrity is precluded from ob-
jecting to the use of his name had merit only in an action for the 
invasion of privacy which, as Judge Neville stated, was separate 
from the right in contention.420 The time and effort invested by 
baseball players in achieving fame was to be rewarded by the 
income generated from agreements such as those negotiated by 
the association.m 
The Uhlaender ruling safeguards the principle that name 
and likeness rights constitute a viable property interest.422 The 
Palmer and Uhlaender holdings have been summarized as fol-
lows: "In addition to the just result rendered in Uhlaender, its 
value lies in the fact that the court, in contrast to the Palmer 
court, analyzed the right in question and acknowledged the es-
sential differences between the right of privacy and the right to 
publicity. "423 
The case which conclusively established the right of public-
ity as a property right was Zacchini v. Scripps - Howard Broad-
casting CO.424 Appearing in virtually every American tort text-
book to illustrate the limitations of the first amendment right of 
free speech, the case is helpful in the context of publicity rights. 
415. [d. 
416. [d. 
417. [d. at 1288-89. 
418. [d. at 1279. 
419. [d. at 1280. 
420. [d. at 1283. 
421. [d. at 1282. 
422. [d. at 1283. 
423. Berkman, supra note 250, at 539. 
424. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976). 
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The facts involve Zacchini who, in spite of his express refusal, 
had the tape of his entire 15-second performance as a "human 
cannonball" broadcast by the defendant's television station.'211 
The plaintiff argued before the Ohio State Supreme Court that 
his right to publicity had been infringed by the television sta-
tion.'26 In response, the defendant invoked its first amendment 
rights to report on "newsworthy events."m After a ruling in 
favor of the defendant, the case was appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court.'28 The lower court's holding was re-
versed, the Supreme Court finding that the plaintiff's perform-
ance was compensable as a property right thereby rendering in-
effective the constitutional defense.'29 The Court reasoned that 
Zacchini had developed an unusual act which the defendant's 
broadcast had minimized the likelihood that the public would 
pay to see, the performance of which had been provided for free 
to those viewing at home.4so 
The Supreme Court concluded that a valuable property in-
terest was affected because "the telecast had gone beyond the 
bounds of First Amendment protection by appropriating 
Zacchini's 'entire act.' "4S1 Publicity, as a means from which in-
come is derived, is viewed at the highest level of the federal judi-
ciary as an important right of property.'S2 The courts will pro-
tect individuals such as Zacchini from appropriations which seek 
to remove the monetary gain derived from commercial endeav-
ors in the public sphere.'ss 
The American cases unequivocally established that a right 
to publicity was entitled to protection either independently of or 
in coexistence with the right to privacy.4s4 The application of 
these rights to celebrities by the American courts developed logi-
cally from the early cases, and such courts now regard the com-
425. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d 454. 
426. [d. at 460. 
427. [d. at 460-61. 
428. 433 U.S. 562 (1979). 
429. [d. at 576. 
430. [d. 
431. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the 
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1590-91 (1979) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 579 & n.l (Powell, 
J., dissenting)). 
432. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570. 
433. [d. 
434. Rader, supra note I, at 243. 
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mercial exploitation of name and likeness to be an important 
attribute of a public figure's career.'36 The benefit to celebrities 
which may arise from merchandising, licensing contracts and en-
dorsements can potentially yield an income far greater and 
longer lasting than the primary field in which notoriety and pub-
lic recognition was achieved.'36 Legal protection of such income 
will enable film stars, recording artists, athletes, and local public 
performers to enjoy the "fruit of their labor."'37 
Once the courts had characterized publicity as a property 
right, they were, as the cases to follow illustrate, faced with a 
deluge of litigation regarding standing to bring a claim for mis-
appropriation.'38 Certainly the celebrity is entitled to ask for ju-
dicial recognition of the right to publicity. '39 But the issue of 
whether the heirs of a public figure could claim protection on 
their own behalf still required adjudication. 440 The inheritability 
of name and likeness rights was also unsettled."1 The attempt of 
the courts to cope with the issue of divisibility has been summa-
rized as follows: 
When first presented with this theory, courts 
found it sufficiently disconcerting to reject it out-
right. However, after two decades of agreement 
that the right of publicity is a property right, the 
idea became more palatable, and several courts 
held that the right could be inherited . . . other 
cases have proposed different rationales and came 
to different conclusions about the circumstances 
under which inheritance may occur.H2 
Price u. Hal Roach Studios Inc. 443 established that a right of 
publicity did not terminate upon the death of the celebrity 
whose likeness was the subject of revenue.'44 The parties to this 
action were the respective widows of Oliver Hardy and Stanley 
Laurel, who were the designated beneficiaries of the estates be-
435. Denicola. supra note 277. at 62-63. 
436. Hefter & Besha. supra note 290, at 593. 
437. Nimmer, supra note 237, at 216. 
438. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 431, at 1593. 
439. [d. at 1589. 
440. [d. at 1593. 
441. [d. 
442. [d. at 1595. 
443. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
444. [d. at 844. 
55
Buchanan: Appropriation of Personality
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1988
356 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:301 
longing to the two famous comic actors.4411 
As plaintiffs, the widows brought a claim against Roach Stu-
dios, for their use of the names and likenesses of Laurel and 
Hardy.446 The defendant, which had entered into several service 
contracts with the actors for the years 1923 through 1939, 
claimed that any rights to which the actors had been entitled 
had been waived, or, in the alternative, that such rights were in 
the public domain.'" Since the plaintiffs did not contest Roach's 
right to market the films and still photographs taken while the 
actors were under contract with the studio, the court focused 
only on the request that the defendant be restrained from mer-
chandising the names or likenesses of Laurel and Hardy after 
the expiration of the contract term.448 Counsel for the defendant 
attempted to establish that a clause which granted "to Roach 
the exclusive rights to photograph, copyright, and reproduce all 
the 'acts, poses, plays and appearances' of Laurel and Hardy for 
the contract term and 'perpetually' "449 was the equivalent of a 
non-revocable license.'lIo The court, however, construed the 
clause to relate only to the films and photographs taken while 
the actors were employees of the studio, and not to mean that 
Roach was entitled to exploit their personalities in any other 
context .. m 
Both the actors had continued to pursue their careers after 
the expiration of their studio contracts, which indicated that a 
perpetual right accorded to Roach "was neither contemplated by 
the parties nor specifically provided for in the contracts."'112 This 
conclusion was further supported by the fact that Stanley Laurel 
had specifically insisted that he be free to appear on the radio 
for the purpose of endorsing various products.4113 The court 
placed great emphasis on the fact that, after both actors had left 
the employment of Roach Studios, their subsequent work was 
445. [d. at 838. 
446. [d. at 839. 
447. [d. 
448. [d. at 840. 
449. [d. 
450. [d. at 540-42. 
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left undisturbed.4114 
After finding that the contract produced at trial by the de-
fendant was insufficient to support a claim that Roach owned 
the exclusive rights claimed by the plaintiffs, the court then con-
sidered the issue of waiver.4li1i The defendant theorized that, due 
to the actors' failure to use their names and likenesses for the 
years 1940 to 1954, their right to publicity was abandoned.41i6 
Judge Stewart described this argument as "nonsensical,"41i7 and 
cited the New York privacy statute which provides that a celeb-
rity may elect to leave unused his public profile.41i6 
Judge Stewart's opinion provides an important supplement 
to the statutory law on the issue of devisability, for he concluded 
that "[t]here cannot, therefore, be any necessity to exercise the 
right of publicity during one's life in order to protect it from use 
by others or to preserve any potential right of one's heirs".41i9 
His holding illustrates the flaw in the arguments presented by 
the defendant, for by claiming that the right to publicity exists 
only for the duration of a celebrity's life, counsel mistook public-
ity for privacy.460 
The right of privacy has been defined as a personal right to 
protect against harm to individual feelings.461 It follows that this 
right will perish with the individual who may have found the 
necessity to invoke its protection.462 For this reason, the right of 
privacy cannot be assigned or inherited as it is essentially a per-
sonal right protecting individual integrity.463 In reference to the 
right of publicity, the Price court concluded: "There appears to 
be no logical reason to terminate this right upon death of the 
person protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this 
publicity right has been deemed a 'property right.' "464 It is im-
454. [d. 






461. Berkman, supra note 250, at 527. 
462. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 431, at 1593. 
463. [d. 
464. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844. 
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portant to note that, while the court maintained the plaintiffs' 
right to control the names and likenesses of "Stan and OIly," 
such rights were enforceable by designated heirs as distin-
guished from "mere descendants.""66 
In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,'66 the plaintiff was ulti-
mately not as successful as the widows of Laurel and Hardy."67 
The defendant, Universal Studios, was the original producer of 
the film "Dracula," which starred the actor Bela Lugosi."68 A 
claim was brought against Universal for invasion of the right to 
publicity following the execution of licensing agreements be-
tween the studio and producers of merchandised items which 
depicted Lugosi in his role as Dracula. "69 The trial court, in ac-
cordance with Haelan and Uhlaender, found that the right to 
publicity had in fact been appropriated."70 The court also deter-
mined that Lugosi's right to publicity could be inherited by the 
beneficiaries to his will. m 
This happy ending was not the final ending, for Universal 
appealed the case to the Court of Appeal of California,"72 which 
determined that there was no policy basis to support the sur-
vival of a right of publicity surviving the death of the individual 
concerned.473 Thus, Lugosi's heirs were not entitled to the exclu-
sive right to market Lugosi as Dracula.474 
The court noted that Lugosi himself had failed to exploit 
the marketing potential of his name and likeness during his life-
time.476 Lugosi's nonuse for the entire duration of his career re-
sulted in a forfeiture of the right to publicity.476 Had any aspect 
of the Dracula personality been used for commercial purposes 
during the actor's life, the court might have provided a ruling 
465. [d. at 844 n.8. 
466. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977). 
467. [d. at 40. 
468. [d. at 36. 
469. [d. 
470. [d. at 37. 
471. [d. 
472. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977), aff'd, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 
P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). 
473. [d. at 40. 
474. [d. 
475. [d. at 37. 
476. [d. at 38. 
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similar to the decision in Price. 
The question of whether a celebrity must market the right 
to publicity during his lifetime was again raised in Groucho 
Marx Productions v. Day and Night CO.·77 This action involved 
the assignees of the Marx Brothers rights to publicity.·78 The 
defendant, Day and Night, produced a play entitled "A Day In 
Hollywood/A Night In the Ukraine,"·79 which allegedly infringed 
upon the characterization of the Marx Brothers.·8o Although the 
names Groucho, Chico and Harpo were never mentioned, the 
script involved a depiction of Anton Chekov's novel, The Bear, 
as performed by three actors utilizing the style of acting made 
famous by the Marx Brothers.481 The plaintiff claimed damages 
"in the nature of a license fee."·82 
The United States District Court of New York granted a 
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.'83 Judge 
Connor found that the appropriate substantive law to govern the 
action was that of New York which, unlike California, recog-
nized an inheritable right to publicity.484 Also, since under New 
York law a celebrity was required to exploit his name and like-
ness rights during his lifetime, Connor found that a commercial 
use was inherent in the actors' performance itself.'8Ci Thus every 
performance, act, or public appearance by the Marx Brothers 
"was sufficient exploitation without the need for them to 'en-
dorse dance studios, candy bars or tee shirts.' "486 
Like the ruling in Lugosi, this judgment in favor of the as-
signees was also short-lived.'87 On appeal, Judge Newman deter-
mined that the appropriate choice of law was that of Califor-
nia.'88 In accordance with the rules of that state, he found that 
the right to publicity and the right of privacy terminated upon a 
477. Groucho Marx Prod. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
478. [d. at 318. 
479. [d. 
480. [d. 






487. [d. at 322. 
488. [d. 
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celebrity's death.4s9 The New York judgment was vacated.490 
Judge Connor's contention that mere performance by the celeb-
rity was a sufficient ground on which his heirs could recover was 
therefore overruled.491 The appellate court had construed more 
narrowly the criteria for determining whether exploitation of 
name and likeness had occurred.492 In stating the rationale be-
hind judgment for the defendant, the court mentioned that the 
original play produced by Day and Night was distinct from the 
products endorsed by the Marx Brothers.493 Thus, while the 
original three actors had advertised items "ranging from Plym-
outh Automobiles to Smirnoff Vodka,"494 the defendant, by us-
ing the likenesses of the Marx Brothers for an unrelated project, 
was free from liability.496 
In order for the plaintiff's claim to succeed, the court re-
quired evidence proving that the use complained of was similar 
to a prior exploitation.496 Judge Newman's holding could be in-
terpreted as leaving the plaintiff without a remedy unless the 
defendant sued exploited an area the Marx Brothers had pro-
moted, such as Plymouth or Smirnoff. 
Judge Newman was not the first to hold that the right to 
publicity must be subordinated to the public interest, which al-
lows for the production of fictional accounts based upon a par-
ticular celebrity's life or work. In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg 
Productions,m a claim was brought to enjoin a television pro-
duction concerning the life of Rudolpho Guglielmi, better known 
by his stage name Rudolph Valentino. 
The plaintiff, Valentino's nephew and legal heir, objected to 
a network program entitled "Legend of Valentino: A Romantic 
Fiction.',m The use of Valentino's name and likeness without 
prior consent was construed by the plaintiff to be a violation of 
489. [d. at 323. 
490. [d. 
491. [d. at 322. 
492. [d. 




497. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979). 
498. [d. at 862, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. 
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the right to publicity, which the nephew, as heir to the estate, 
sought to protect.499 Chief Justice Bird, on hearing the com-
plaint, seized upon the "context and nature of the use,"IIOO citing 
these as the factors which would control the disposition of the 
case. IIOl The defendant admitted that Valentino was the central 
character in the program, but maintained that the use was re-
lated to the actor's own medium and did not promote products 
which were distinct from the actor as an individual.ll02 The 
plaintiff claimed that the fictional nature of the work was a seri-
ous threat to future publicity rights. llos Chief Justice Bird dis-
missed this argument, reasoning that the defendant's production 
was just as likely to inspire curiosity, which would in turn create 
a market for authorized biographies, as it was to adversely affect 
future plans for merchandising.llo" The court felt that fictional 
dramatization was incapable of endangering later factual ac-
counts involving the legendary Valentino.lloll 
The resolution of the case depended on which interest was 
to be given the greater protection: the creative thought invested 
by the defendant or the property interest claimed by the plain-
tiff.ll06 In rendering judgment for the defendant, Chief Justice 
Bird argued that free speech was not to be compromised by an 
aggrieved individual's proprietary claim.1l07 "No author should 
be forced into creating mythological words or characters wholly 
divorced from reality. The right of publicity derived from public 
prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature, par-
ody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative 
comments. "1108 
Chief Justice Bird was not merely protecting the right of an 
author to draw upon people and events which may be used as a 
source of material and inspiration. Her statements outline the 
important distinction between the creative use of a celebrity for 
499. [d. 
500. [d. at 864, 603 P.2d at 457, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 355. 
501. [d. 
502. [d. 
503. [d. at 870, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
504. [d. at 870, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
505. [d. 
506. [d. 
507. [d. at 869, 603 P.2d at 460, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 358. 
508. [d. 
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the purpose of disseminating ideas and the less valued appropri-
ation which is expressed in the merchandising of unrelated 
products.llo9 
This judgment leaves undisturbed cases which involve ap-
propriations commited for the purpose of ancillary exploitation 
in markets unrelated to the celebrity, or where .the information 
presented is of limited social utility. It was this distinction 
which precluded Valentino's nephew from claiming the royalties 
generated by the defendant's production.lllo 
The court in Estate of Presley v. Russenlill was faced with 
similar competing interests when the heirs of Elvis Presley 
sought to enjoin the defendant from producing a live show which 
imitated the late star.1il2 The theatrical performance in question 
was called "The Big EI Show" (a tribute to Elvis Presley),lIl3 in 
which a Mr. Larry Seth appeared in the traditional "Elvis" cos-
tume, which incorporated a jumpsuit, jewelry and scarves which 
were handed out to the audience. IIH Songs performed by Seth 
were those made famous by Presley, and Presley's poses and 
choreography were imitated.1ilIi Performances were given 
throughout the United States and Canada without authority in 
the form of a contract or license from the estate.lll6 As succes-
sors, Presley's heirs claimed that their right to publicity was in-
fringed by the Big EI Show.1i17 Judge Brotman applied the same 
test as that used by Chief Justice Bird to determine whether the 
performance served any social utility by providing "a substantial 
value to society."1I18 The production, in spite of its popularity, 
involved imitation as opposed to creative or biographical inter-
pretation.1il9 Audiences watching the performance were at best 
informed about a singer who shaped the development of the mu-
sic and entertainment industry.1I2o Imitation was, in the estima-
509. [d. at 874, 603 P.2d at 463, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 361. 
510. [d. at 875, 603 P.2d at 464, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 362. 
511. 513 1<'. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
512. [d. at 1344. 
513. [d. at 1349. 
514. [d. at 1348. 
515. [d. 
516. [d. at 1349. 
517. [d. at 1354. 
518. [d. at 1359. 
519. [d. 
520. [d. at 1360. 
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tion of the court, lacking in creativity and without social 
merit. m For this reason, judgment was granted for the plaintiff, 
since the primary function of the defendant's production was to 
"appropriate the commercial value of the likeness of Elvis 
Presley. "522 
The court also asked whether the right to publicity could be 
subject to inheritance.1I23 The judgment of the New Jersey court 
found that the heirs to the Presley estate were, by inheritance, 
entitled to enjoy the benefits achieved by Presley.524 The right to 
publicity itself had, in previous decisions, been recognized and 
was, in the court's view, capable of being the subject of a lease or 
assignment.1I2II Since the plaintiffs were designated beneficiaries 
under Presley's will, they had standing to challenge the defend-
ant's appropriation.526 Unfortunately, the action requested an 
interim, as opposed to a final, injunction regarding the defend-
ant's production.527 In this action, the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate injury and neglected to request a permanent injunction 
which could have resulted in a holding in their favor. 1I28 The case 
is nevertheless important since it established that publicity 
rights may become the property of a designated beneficiary 
under a valid will.1I29 
The litigation brought by those seeking financial advantage 
from the royalties accruing to the Presley estate was considera-
ble.lISo In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,m the holder of an 
exclusive license to exploit commercially the name and likeness 
of Elvis Presley requested an injunction and damages against 
defendant Pro Arts.1IS2 Factors had obtained its license two days 
after Presley's death for the sum of $100,000, and began prepar-
ing merchandised items almost immediately.1IS3 Also seeking to 
521. [d. at 1359. 
522. [d. at 1360. 
523. [d. at 1354. 
524. [d. at 1361. 
525. [d. at 1335. 
526. [d. at 1361. 
527. [d. at 1344. 
528. [d. at 1379. 
529. [d. at 1361. 
530. [d. at 1339; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978). 
531. Factors, 579 F.2d at 215. 
532. [d. at 216. 
533. [d. at 217. 
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benefit from the income that Elvis memorabilia could render, 
Pro Arts purchased the copyright to a photograph of Presley 
taken by a journalist.1I34 Three days after Presley's death, the 
defendant produced for sale a poster size blowup of the photo-
graph which read "In Memory - 1935-1977."11311 . 
On learning of the defendant's activities, Factors requested 
that the item be removed from the market.1I36 In support of its 
refusal to comply with the plaintiff's demand, Pro Arts claimed 
that the right of publicity was extinguished at Presley's death, 
or alternatively, that the poster was merely a reminder of an 
event which could be classified as newsworthy.1I37 The court re-
jected the second contention, ruling that the product, being 
neither creative nor newsworthy, was not entitled to protection 
under the first amendment.1I3s 
In ruling on the case, Judge Ingraham held that the right to 
publicity, unlike the right of privacy, was capable of surviving 
the death of a celebrity.1i39 Factors, as a bona fide licensee, was 
properly asserting its own contractual right to claim the royal-
ties and entitlement to exploit the name and likeness of Elvis 
Presley.1I40 This conclusion embraced the theory of unjust en-
richment, for a contrary ruling would have provided a gain to 
those engaged in the unconsented to exploitation of a deceased 
public figure. 1I41 Judge Ingraham added: "[A]t the same time, the 
exclusive right purchased by Factors and the financial benefits 
accruing to the celebrity's heirs would be rendered virtually 
worthless."1142 This interpretation of the aim toward which the 
law should strive in defining the relationship and concurrent 
rights of parties such as those in the instant case was not upheld 
on appeal.li43 Although the issue of whether a celebrity must 




537. Id. at 219. 
538. Id. at 222. 




543. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'g 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). 
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mercial ventures, not resolved, this requirement further nar-
rowed the publicity doctrine.I!" 
If the heirs of a public figure are to be successful in claiming 
for their own benefit, publicity rights, there must be evidence 
"that the celebrity 'acted in such a way as to evidence his or her 
own recognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his or her 
name or likeness', and manifested that recognition in some overt 
manner, e.g. making an inter vivos transfer in the rights of the 
name."1!41! 
Judge Ingraham's view would provide celebrities with the 
ability to designate, after death, those individuals to whom fi-
nancial benefits are to flow. This would accord with the premise 
upon which private property and the entire area comprising the 
law of wills and trusts had been established. The right to public-
ity, having achieved status as a property right, must be subject 
to alienation by the celebrity who created the interest. Although 
this provides a benefit to designated beneficiaries at the expense 
of more commercially enterprising individuals, the law of inheri-
tance sanctions unconditional donations. Just as private individ-
uals are free to decide matters affecting the distribution of their 
property, those who work in professions which invite public no-
toriety should be accorded the same opportunity and freedom of 
decision. 
V. ADVERTISING PRACTICE 
Turning from judicial sources of relief for the instances of 
appropriation, the advertising industry in Britain developed 
standards to guide those wishing to use the name and likeness of 
a celebrity for promotional purposes. These rules are codified in 
The British Code of Advertising Practice646 [hereafter "British 
Code"] and The IBA Code of Advertising Standards and Prac-
tice647 [hereafter "IBA Code"]. The British Code is concerned 
with non-broadcast advertisements, and applies to promotions 
544. Factors, 579 F.2d at 216. 
545. Rader, supra note 1, at 235. 
546. THE BRITISH CODE OF ADVERTISING PRACTICE (Cap committee 7th ed. Oct. 1985) 
[hereinafter "BRITISH CODE"). 
547. THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY CODE OF ADVERTISING STANDARDS 
AND PRACTICE, (lBA July 1986) [hereinafter "IBA CODE"]. 
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appearing in "newspapers, magazines, printed publications, pos-
ters, cinema and video-cassette commercials, viewdata services, 
as well as leaflets and brochures wherever they appear."M8 In an 
attempt to go beyond the standard that previously required ad-
vertisements to be "legal, decent, honest and truthful,"1i49 the 
British Code places particular emphasis on the extent to which 
an individual may be exploited in an advertisement.lilio Section 
17.1 states that "advertisements should not portray or refer to 
any living persons, in whatever form or by whatever means, un-
less their express prior permission has been obtained."lilil This 
protection, although apparently comprehensive, is diminished by 
an exception which allows exploitation if the product is not "in-
consistent with the celebrity's position,"1i1i2 and does not inter-
fere with the individual's "right to enjoy a reasonable degree of 
privacy."lilis Ostensibly, this provides recognition of a right of 
privacy by requiring that this right be free from commercial in-
vasion.1iIi4 But a celebrity whose name and likeness was used in a 
marketing strategy consistent with his public character may be 
without a remedy.1i1i1i This is best illustrated by advertisements 
which utilize a double entendre for promotion. For example, an 
alcohol distributor published a headline which read "vodka 
without Russchian is like Lenin without McCartney."1i1i6 It is 
reasonable to assume from the appearance of the advertisement 
that some members of the public would construe this as an 
endorsement. 
Although David Frost was able to stop the owners of a new 
hotel from using his photograph in conjunction with a caption 
which read "no matter who you are we can make you feel at 
home,,,m it was only due to the threat of a libel action that the 
proprietors agreed to withdraw the advertisement.1iIi8 Even this 
type of claim will not always be effective in preventing un au tho-
548. BRITISH CODE, supra note 546, at 19. 
549. [d. at 8. 
550. [d. at 31. 
551. [d. at 31, §17.1. 
552. [d. at 31, §17.2. 
553. [d. 
554. [d. at 31. 
555. Frazer, supra note 2, at 282 n.6. 
556. [d. at 282. 
557. R. WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 167 (1980). 
558. [d. 
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rized use, for the plaintiff must prove that the advertisement 
contains a defamatory implication in order to sustain a libel ac-
tion. ll1i9 Thus, a public figure's name, when isolated from the con-
text of an overt or defamatory endorsement, may still be ex-
ploited by advertisers.1I6o 
Additionally, the requirement that "living" persons must 
first give their express consent would make available to advertis-
ers the names and likenesses of celebrities now deceased.1I61 The 
British Code does not state whether permission from heirs is re-
quired for exploitation of a public figure,1I62 and as such is not 
useful in an attempt to prohibit appropriation of public figures 
no longer alive.1I6a 
The IBA Code is concerned exclusively with advertisements 
broad casted on television and radio.II6' This code aspires to a 
higher quality of advertising because it is thought that those lis-
tening to radio or television programs in the home or car are a 
captive audience.1I611 Provision 13 of the IBA Code contains the 
limits within which celebrities and all other individuals may be 
exploited for promotional purposes.1I66 This provision reads: "In-
dividual living persons should not normally be portrayed or re-
ferred to in an advertisement without their permission."1167 The 
IBA Code provisions are basically a set of guiding rules created 
for the advertising industry.1I68 But the drafting is too weak to 
provide any significant protection, whether an individual is a ce-
lebrity or not, since the code is not legally enforceable.1I69 The 
use of the word "normally" indicates that there might be excep-
tions which would justify unauthorized use of name or like-
ness.1I70 It is still possible for one who provides an unusual rea-
son which would justify appropriation to abuse a celebrity's 
559. [d. at 167-68. 
560. [d. at 168. 
561. BRITISH CODE, supra note 546, at 31, §17.1. 
562. [d. 
563. [d. 
564. IBA CODE, supra note 547, at 3. 
565. [d. 
566. [d. at 4. 
567. [d. 
568. [d. at 3. 
569. [d. at 2. 
570. [d. at 4. 
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right to publicity.1I7l Perhaps the most helpful provision in the 
IBA Code is the rule which requires all advertisers broadcasting 
on television and radio to comply with both statutory and com-
mon law.1I72 The IBA Code is enforced through self-regulation 
within the advertising industry, but stronger legislation is re-
quired to safeguard the individual. 
The British and IBA Codes, while providing guidelines and 
theoretical principles, are not enforceable and do not fill the gap 
created by the British courts' dilatory action in providing judi-
cial remedies for appropriation. There is a great need for reform 
in the common law. Legislation should be provided to control 
the taking without compensation of a celebrity's right to public-
ity. In the absence of change, abuses of this property right in the 
form of lost income, merchandising opportunities, and personal 
dignity will flourish. 
VI. CONCLUSION - FUTURE LEGISLATION 
The American common law has developed to accommodate 
a right of privacy and to ensure that the right to publicity con-
stitutes a viable source of income for celebrities. The ability of 
famous individuals to capitalize on the endorsement of products 
can provide large sums of revenue. Not only is this avenue for 
realizing income important to a public figure, it may also serve 
as the only means by which the heirs of a mismanaged celebrity 
can benefit. 
English law regarding the appropriation of name and like-
ness rights lags behind the relatively recent strides made in 
America. Due to the fact that actions for passing off still require 
a common field of activity between the plaintiff and defendant, 
this tort is of limited value to a celebrity whose name or likeness 
has been the subject of appropriation. Additionally, English 
courts are reluctant to interfere with free competition, which 
frequently results in the judicial giveaway of merchandising op-
portunities to those engaged in the exploitation of a public fig-
ure's personality. But neither country has successfully developed 
a coherent system which can afford adequate protection. The 
571. [d. 
572. [d. at 3, provo 2. 
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characterization of publicity as a property right rather than a 
transient personal interest is important. More vital still is the 
need to provide a means by which this property, like any other, 
may descend to chosen beneficiaries. In the world of constantly 
advancing technology and swifter modes of communication, 
those who wish to appropriate names and likenesses are fur-
nished with a variety of methods to do so. It is from the courts 
that celebrities should be able to obtain redress. The law should 
provide safeguards which will enable individuals to benefit from 
their own labor. Future legislation may provide protection for 
celebrities by implementing the proposals contained in the fol-
lowing model. 
(1) Legislative recognition of a statutory right of 
publicity, i.e. the right vested in each [celebrity: 
one with "fame, renown, wide recognition"]G73 of 
the sole right to 'exploit' commercially his own 
name and likeness, or to refrain therefrom. 
(2) No person shall take for commercial purposes 
the name or likeness of a celebrity without first 
having obtained a license, from that celebrity or 
his agent. 
(3) "Commercial purposes" shall include, but not 
be limited to, (a) endorsements; (b) merchandized 
items; (c) creative or fictional works not contain-
ing a newsworthy character; (d) any product of-
fered for sale to the public, utilizing name or 
likeness. 
(4) A celebrity will be entitled to exercise his 
right to publicity at any time and will not be pre-
cluded from entering into agreements with a 
party contracting to exploit the same. 
(5) In the event that the celebrity is no longer liv-
ing, the legatees of his estate will be vested with 
the right to negotiate publicity rights and licenses 
on their own behalf. 
(6) The fee for licensing agreements will be calcu-
lated with reference to the nature and extent of 
the use made. 
(7) In the event that name or likeness rights are 
exploited in the absence of license, the party own-
ing the right to publicity will be entitled to en-
force a license effective immediately upon the dis-
573. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 235. (World Publishing Co. 1966). 
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covery of the use, and damages will be added to 
the fee designated. 
(8) Publicity rights will be the property of a ce-
lebrity or his heirs for a term not exceeding the 
life of the celebrity plus fifty years, and, upon ex-
piration, his name and reputation will be within 
the public domain. 
(9) A private organization will be established to 
provide enforcement and redress to those owning 
the right of publicity, and will include affiliated 
bodies to provide reciprocal protection on an in-
ternational basis. 
The establishment of a private organization to provide a 
system of registration and licensing for publicity rights is advisa-
ble. Appropriations which occur on an international basis must 
be traced by a body similar in structure and function to a Per-
forming Rights Society. II,. But the scope of any such future or-
ganization must be enlarged to include affiliates in countries 
where publicity rights are employed for advertising purposes. 
The use of name and likeness would be monitored within each 
specified geographical area, and enforced by contractual agree-
ment. Associated bodies are therefore necessary to provide pro-
tection since the law has not kept pace with rapidly developing 
media technology, which in its most advanced form is repre-
sented by satellite broadcasting throughout the world. In the ab-
sence of clear legislative and judicial rules, and in the presence 
of the ineffective self-regulating measures taken by the advertis-
ing industry, a society charged with the aim of enforcing protec-
tion of name and likeness rights may be the only effective means 
by which protection against appropriation can occur. 
574. The Performing Rights Society, an organization composed of writers and pub-
lishers of music, the function of which is to enforce copyright throughout many Euro-
pean countries. 
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